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Li many  countries,  the mismatch  between  whRt  the railways  unlikely  to permit  a serious  level of competition  in markets
offer and what  customers  want has caused  significant  they  have traditionally  controlled.  A need for intranodal
econonic inefficiency  and severe  financial  strains  for the  rail competition  - either in large  countries  with  well-
railways  and their  government  owners.  The concept  of the  developed  rail systems  or in adjacent  countries  with
railway  as a monolithic  entity  is so strong  in many  countri.s  integrated  economies,  as in the European  Community  -
as to be a roadblock  against  reshaping  the railway.  Yet such  could  promote  greater  use of competitive  access  solutions.
reshaping  has already  taken  place successfully  in such  The  "wholesaler"  option  should  accomplish  an
countries  as Canada, Japan,  New  Zealand,  Spain,  Sweden,  excellent  marketing  job, but  the actual  operation  would
the United  Kingdom,  and the United  States  - and shows  remain  in monolithic  hands.  When  the quality  of customer
promise  elsewhere.  service  is paramount  (as  in container  landbridge  services  or
Where  incremental  approaches  are feasible,  a useful  in certain  unit train applications)  or when  the rail service  is
first step in bringing  the market  to the railway  is a transition  driven  by external  requirements  (as in container  dry ports),
to some  form of lines-of-business  strategy,  which,  like  it may be best if the railway  is a "wholesaler"  selling  to a
British Rail,  could  be intensified  in stages.  Where  incre-  "retailer"  who  relates  directly  (and  more  effectively)  with
mental  approaches  have not worked,  cannot  work,  or have  the customer.
reached  the limits  of their effectiveness,  a country  should  The "toll rail enterprise"  might  come  closest  to
consider  the full  range of options Moyer  and Thompson  reflecting  a theoretical  model  of marketing  effectiveness,
explore  in this paper.  yet it would  generate  potential  operating  conflicts  and
The nonolithic  railway  rates high on apparent  higher  transaction  costs  - and would  also call for the
technical  efficiency  (conflicts  are decided  by executive  fiat  greatest  administrative  capability  in the owning  govern-
and transacdon  costs are minimized)  but low  on marketing  ment.  Where  a rail service  is easily  separable  from  other
effectiveness.  A monolithic  railway  might be an appropriate  services,  or where  the service  does  not confli't heavily with
choice  for a fully planned,  command  economy  (or for a true  other  services,  a "toll rail enterprise"  solution  may be
single-purpose  operator  such as a mining  evacuation  desirable  - as with Amtrak,  VIA  (the Canadian  Amtrak),
railway)  - although  a desire  for better  measurement  of  and the Japanese  Rail Freight  Corporation.  Situations  in
performance  might  still lead to a line-of-business  organiza-  which  this approach  might work  best: granting  trackage
tion.  rights  to  Zimbabwe  to serve the port of Beira  in Mozamn-
The lines-of-business  option  improves  accountability  bique and to Russian  Railways  to serve the port of Tallinn
and responsiveness  to markets  but operating  conflicts  and  in Estonia.
transaction  costs increase  as the monolith  becomes  divided.  One generalization  holds  true  in all circumstances:  a
Economies  in transition,  small  railways  with  a restricted  monolithic  railway  does not function  well  in a market
number  of customers,  or larger  railways  seeking  to depart  economy  in competition  with privately  owned,  properly
incrementally  from a monolidtic  framework  will  probably  (lighdy)  regulated  competitors  - especially  trucking.  All
find the line-of-business  approach  the best first step.  attempts  to  commercialize,  corporatize,  or increase  the role
The corretitive access  option  introduces  intramodal  of the private  sector  in railway  activities  have  started  with
competition  in selected  markets,  while  maintaining  unitary  one or another  form of reshaping  the railway  entity.
control  over  most railway  operations.  Unless  the distribu-  Soludons  will  vary,  but the universal  objective  as an
tion  of "franchises"  is self-balancing  - providing  clear  economy  becomes  more  market-driven  is to make  the
benefits  to all participants  - the owning  railways  are  railway  more  market-sensitive.
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Background: Why Reshape the Railway?
i.  Historically, railways throughout the world developed as monolithic organizations,
controlling their own facilities, performing all  operating and administrative functions, and
unilateraily  determining  what services to provide to an often captive market. Such an evolution
faithfully  reflected the conditions  of the times.  In the nineteenth  century, railways represented
the vanguard of technology;  they could reliably depend only on themselves  to produce most of
their material needs.  Moreover, as the dominant means of overland transport, railways from
their inception could essentially  dictate the products they would offer (without much regard to
customer  preferences)  and  the  prices  they  would  charge  (without  attention  to  cost
considerations), subject only to any. available intramodal competition.  Acknowledging  this
monopoly  status, regulatory  structures  arose to control it, and in many countries  perpetuated  the
illusion of monopoly  long after competing  modes  had emerged in the transportation  marketplace.
In the socialist  economies, the adoption of central planning  reinforced the railway as a unitary
organization. Throughout  the world, therefore, autarky and monopoly  produced and preserved
the railway monolith.
ii.  In most countries, the production, market, and political conditions  originally favoring
monolithic  rail transport entities no longer exist.  Although  constantly  evolving  and improving,
railway technology  is esoteric no longer.  Railways  are increasingly  able to rely on a host of
outside suppliers and service organizations to perform infrastructure, maintenance, adminis-
trative, and even operating  functions,  as dictated by economic  considerations. Moreover, in the
presence of mature, competing  transport modes, railways  can no longer be oblivious  to customer
preferences in designing services, nor can they price services without regard to their costs.
Finally, the extreme centralization  of all economic decisions that formerly characterized the
socialist states (and their railways) is dissipating. In light of all these changes, the traditional
unitary railway -- in which the lowest official  dealing with both revenues and costs may well be
the general manager  or the president -- has become  incongruous,  and not just from a theoretical
viewpoint.
iii.  In many countries, the mismatch  between what the railways offer and what customers
want has caused both pronounced economic  inefficiencies  and severe financial strains for the
railways and their government owners.  In much of the world, the railways' losses of market
share, burgeoning deficits, and mushrooming  demands for State funding have led to enormous
pressures on governments  to effect a fundamental  restructuring  of the railway entity itself, and
of its relationship  with the State.
iv.  These  underlying pressures  may  manifest  themselves in  explicit  and  implicit
Government  objectives for reshaping the railway.  Typical objectives  may include:
Improve economic  efficiency;*  Reduce railway deficits and government  funding burdens;
*  Promote creative and aggressive  management;
*  Allow and encourage the railway to function as a market-sensitive,  commercial
enterprise;
*  Enhance intramodal or intermodal transport competition;
*  Obtain improved management  information  and performance evaluation through
financial separation;
*  Equalize conditions  for rail vis-a-vis other modes;
*  Increase the role of the private sector in railways;
*  Foster public policy in planning  and national development;  and
*  Shake the foundations  of the old railway order and its entrenched interests.
V.  One approach -- "separation"  of fixed facility ownership from train operations -- has
gained prominence  in recent years as a response  to some  of the objectives  above. This  emphasis
on 'separationI  has, to some  degree,  misrepresented  and overimmplified  the issue. In fact, a
full continuum of options exists for reshaping the railway entity.  'a  any country, the aptness
of each option depends on the relative weight and urgency of governmental  objectives; on the
relative importance  of the various markets served by the railway; on the available technology;
on the scale of railway operations as a whole; and on the administrative  capabilities of the
government and of the railway.  Moreover, in practice, the vastly complex three-dimensional
matrix of operating functions, service types, and geographic zones that characterizes mature
railway systems may call for a sophisticated  combination of restructuring  options, rather than
for any single solution. One option might be chosen for freight (or freight sub-markets),  another
for intercity passenger, and yet another for suburban  passenger.
vi.  Focusing on selected points on the continuum, this paper explores generic reshaping
options that can be altered or combined to fit the unique circumstances  of individual railway
entities.
The Generic Options
vii.  In essence, each option expresses a possible set of relationships  between the railway
entity/entities, the markets served, and the functions performed.  Indeed, today's railways
perform a wide range of rail transportation services. Typically, this range includes intercity
passenger, suburban passenger, and freight markets; each market can, in  turn, be further
categorized  (for example, into "for-profit" and "not-for-profit"  segments;  by geographic  region,- iii  -
line,  or city-pair;  by class  of service  for  passenger;  and by commodity  or service  characteristics
for freight). In serving  these  markets,  regardless  of the level  of service  differentiation,  railways
must somehow  manage  the following  basic  functions:
•  Ownership,  improvement,  and maintenance  of fixed  facilities;
*  Control  of operations  (i.e., dispatching);
*  Train  movement;
*  Equipment  provision  and maintenance;
*  Marketing;  and
*  Financial  control  and accountability.
yiii.  Option 1:  The Monolithic  Railway (Status  Quo Option).  Traditionally,  the
monolithic  railway  was almost  wholly  production-oriented,  and was organized  so that each
functional  department  exercised  total  and undifferentiated  responsibility  over all services. For
example, a  single department might control maintenance  of  all  coaches, wagons, and
locomotives;  or the train  movement  department  might  maintain  a single  roster  of employees  who
could  be assigned  indiscriminately  to freight,  intercity,  or suburban  passenger  jobs.
ix.  Option  2:  Lines-of-Business  Organization.  As markets,  technology,  and operating
practices  have  evolved,  even  on monolithic  railways,  commonality  has  diminished  to a surprising
degree  among  many  of the assets  and resources  used  in different  markets. Thus, for instance,
electrified  suburban  passenger  services  employ  self-propelled,  multiple-unit  coaches  necessitating
specialized  workshops;  tracks with heavy  commuter  flows tend not to have much freight.
Advances  in management  information  systems  have, furthermore,  improved  the accuracy  and
timeliness  with which  direct  as well as remaining  common  costs can be assigned  to particular
services. These  two  converging  trends  have  enabled  railway  entities  to reorganize  themselves
(to varying  degrees  of depth)  according  to lines of business  so as to foster comprehensive
business  planning,  market-  and cost-sensitive  decisions,  and  more  responsive  operations  for  each
service performed. In essence, this is an option for maldng the monolithic  railway less
monolithic  in a service, if not in a production  sense,  while reducing  the entity start-up  costs
implicit  in other  alternatives.
X.  Option  3:  Competitive  Access. Under this option, competing  railway  companies
would  have  exclusive  control  over some  trackage,  but would  also  have (and  give)  the right of
competitive  access  over the trackage  of (to) other  companies.  One  variation  within  this option
would  be a "regional  overlap"  approach,  wherein  regional  (or  national)  operators  would  be given
the right to operate over tracks leading to major traffic centers in adjoining  regions (or
countries). Smaller-scale  options  such  as trackage  rights  and  joint terminal  agreements  provide
miniature  examples  of the cowpetitive  access  approach.- iv  -
xi.  Option 4:  The "Wholesaler."  The railway entity would own and operate the fixed
facility  and perform all operations  on behalf  of marketing  entities who would  be the 'retailers."
This would mean that the railway itself would only haul trains; it would do no marketing to
shippers. It r;ght  famish some, or all, of the rolling stock and crews, at the retailer's option.
xii.  Option  5:  The "Toil Rail" Enterprise.  The entire fixed facility (track, signals,
communications, electrification, and so forth), except for exclusive facilities, would be the
property and responsibility  of one owner.  There could be one or more authorized user(s), each
of  which would pay  tolls for  use of  the facility.  The tolls would be public and non-
discriminatory, but might well vary by train size, axle load, direction of travel, time of day,
season, and similar criteria.  In a sense, the toll rail enterprise would be much like a regulated
public utility.
xiii.  For each of the above options, Table SC. 1 shows  how functions would  be assigned to
entities, and Table SC.2 refers to examples  among today's railways.
lssues
xiv.  In evaluating these options, railway planners need to consider a series of issues that
reflect both actual experience and a priori analysis.  The list of issues below is indicative,  not
exhaustive;  not all issues will apply to all options. As evidenced  by successful  initiatives  in such
countries as the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Spain, and the United States, these issues do
not constitute insuperable  obstacles to reshaping  railway entities.
xv.  Market Definition.  Will the resultant entity/entities  have a clear and better view of
the markets they serve and the full impacts  of their business decisions  on those markets?
xvi.  Financial Accountability.  Will mechanisms exist to  fix both cost  and revenue
responsibility  at appropriate locations  in the organization(s),  so that effective business  planning
and decisions can occur?
xvii.  Operations Coordination.  If the monolith is divided, what mechanism(s) will be
established to resolve the inevitable  operating conflicts among entities, or even among lines of
business subsidiary  to a single entity? Will the option in and of itself minimize  or exacerbate
such operating conflicts?
xviii.  Intramodal  Competition. Does the option permit an appropriate level of intramodal
competition?
xix.  Appropriate  Maintenance  Levels. Will the option  encourage  or discourage  continuous
maintenance  of the fixed facility at a level of utility that.fily  satifes,  but does  not exceed,  the
needs of users?v  -
Table SC.1
Assignment of Functions to Entities under Reshaping Options
(Note: In any one country, options  can be combined  or altered to fit conditions)
Options  __  _
(1) Monolith  (2) Lines-of-  (3) Competitive  (4) Wholesaler  (5) "Toil Rail'
Business  Access  Enterprise
R=Parent  -owing
L=Line of  Railway  F=Fixed
Business  R2=Railway  Facility
LP=Primary  havbig  R=Railway  Owner
Function  R=Railway  Line-of-Business  Trackage Rights  W=Wholesaler  O=Operator
PFxed  Facility
Ownership  R  R (parent)  RI  R  P
Fixed Facility
Maintenance  R  LP  RI  R  P
Operations  Control  R  LP  RI  R  P or 0
Train Movement  R  L  RI, R2  R  0
Equipment
Provision  R  L  RI, R2  R (W) 
2 0
Equipment
Maintenance  R  LI/  RI, R2,  R (W)
2
/  0
Marketing  R  L  R1, R2  W  0
Accountability  R  L  RI, R2  R, W  F, 0
W/  Where  one line of business  performs  equipment  maintenance  for another, intemal charges  would  be reciprocally  assessed.
2v  In this case the railway would nornally be the primary supplier,  but the wholesaler  could well be an optional  source of
supply for railway rolling  stock.
Table SC.2
Examples of Reshaping Options
Options  Examples"
(1) Monolithic  Railway  Bolivia, China, USSR,  Zimbabwe
(2) Lines-of  Business  Organization  British Rail, RENFE 21,  United States (as a  whole:  freight railways,
Amtrak,  commuter  authorities)
(3) Competitive  Access  Canada (freight; CP and CN are to operate over some parts of each
other's  track);  United  States  (trackage rights  and  joint  teminal
agreements);  Council  of  the  European  Communities'  directive
(competitive  access  concepts)
(4) "Wholesaler"  American President Lines  (double stack),  Norfolk Southern Triple
Crown, haulage  agreements,  Australia
(5) 'Toll Rail" Enterprise  Amtrak, Japan Preight Railway Company,  Japan's Shinkansen  services,
Swedish  Railways  (Sl)/Banverket,  State Railways  of Thailand
1'  Not all these examples  are discussed  in the text of this paper.
7'  Spanish  National Railways. A list of acronyms  appears  at the end of this paper.- vi -
xx.  Track Maintenance  Coordination  with Operations. How will the safety and work
efficiency  needs of the entity maintaining  the track be reconciled  with the needs of other entities
for timely, unrestricted  access to fixed facilities?
xxi.  Private Sector Development. Will the option afford an opportunity for increased
involvement  of the private sector in railway transportation?
xxii.  Startup/Transaction  Costs.  Do the initial costs of implementing  the option, and the
administrative  costs of perpetuating  it, outweigh  its likely benefits?
xxiii.  Table SC.3  evaluates the generic options in  very broad terms according to  their
responsiveness  to each of the issues.  As might be expected, the monolithic railway rates high
on apparent technical efficiency (since conflicts are decided by executive fiat and transaction
costs are minimized),  but low on marketing  effectiveness  considerations. The lines-of-business
option offers improved responsiveness  to  markets and accountability, but reflects increased
operating conflicts and transaction costs as the monolith becomes divided.  The competitive
access option introduces intramodal  competition  in selected markets, while maintaining  unitary
control over most railway operations. Unless th., distribution  of "franchises" is self-balancing,
providing  clear benefits to all participants,  the owning railways are unlikely to permit a serious
level of competition in markets which they have traditionally controlled.  Thus, competitive
access is often an evolutionary approach.  The  'wholesaler'  option should accomplish an
excellent marketing  job, but the actual operation would remain in monolithic hands.  Finally,
the  'toll  rail" enterprise might come closest to reflecting a theoretical model of marketing
effectiveness; yet it would generate potential operating conflicts and higher transaction costs.
This option would also call for the highest degree of administrative  capability in the owning
government.
xxiv.  Circumstances  differ in every country and for each railway.  Since the relative values
applied to each objective (row) in Table SC.3 will vary by country, the ratings shown in each
column cannot simply be added together to  determine an optimum.  Thus,  no  a  priori
conclusions are possible as to which generic option (or combination) would be "best" in a
specific circumstance. Nevertheless,  certain country types and railway characteristics  would,
in  principle, lend themselves most readily to  certain reshaping options.  For  example, a
monolithic railway might be an appropriate choice for a fully planned, command economy (or
for a true single purpose operator such as a mining evacuation  railway) -- although  a desire for
better measurement  of performance might lead to a line of business organization  even in these
circumstances. Economies  in transition, small railways with a restricted number of customers,
or larger railways seeling to depart incrementally  from a monolithic  framework, will probably
find a  lir.:  zf business organization to be a useful first step.  A need for intra-modal rail
competition,  either in large countries  with well developed  rail systems or in adjacent countries
with integrated economies, could promote greater use of competitive  access solutions, as in the
European Community's recent order.  When customer service quality needs are paramount  (as
in container landbridge services or in certain unit train applications),  or when the rail service
is driven by external requirements  (as in container  dry ports), it may be best if the railway is- vii  -
a "wholesaler' selling  to a "retailer" who relates directly (and mo(re  effectively)  with the
customer. Finally, where  a rail service  is easily  separable  from other  services,  and where the
service  does not conflict  heavily  with other services,  a "toll rail" enterprise  solution  may be
desirable.  Examples  of  this possibility  are Amtrak, VIA and the Japanese  Rail Freight
Corporation:  potential  situations  could  be the granting  of trackage  rights  to Zimbabwe  to serve
the port of Beira in Mozambique,  and to Russian  Railways  to serve the port of Tallinn  in
Estonia,  the port of Riga  in Latvia,  or the port of Odessa  in Ukraine.
Table SC.3
Characterization  of Generic  Reshaping  Options
(Options  are rated High (H), Medium  (M), or Low (L)  according  to their  responsiveness  to each  issue.
The characterizations  are  for generic  options  and would  naturally  vary  with  the particulars  of specific
options  scrutinized.)
Options  and  Characterizations
(1)  (2)  (5)
Monolithic  Lines-of-  (3)  "Toil
Raiway  Business  CompeUtive  (4)  Rail"
Issues  (status  quo)  Organization  Access  'Wholesaler"  Enterprise
Market  Definition  L  H  M  H  M
Financial  Accountability  L  MorL  M or L  M  H
Ease  of Operations
Coordination  H  M  M  M  L
Intramodal  Competition  L  L  H  H  M
Appropriate  Maintenance  _
Levels  M  M  M  M+  (Depends  on
l___________  ______________ _____________ ______________  pricing)
Track  Maintenance  Coordi-  H  M  M  M  L
nation  with  Operations
Private  Sector  Development  L  M  M  H  H
Start-up  Problems  and
Transaction  Cost  Burdens  L  M  M  M  H
xxv.  Underlying  all these issues and options  is the basic  tradeoff  between  efficiency  of
producton and effectiveness  in meeting  market needs.  The traditional  monolithic  railway,
organized  in a strictly  hierarchical  pattern along departmental  lines, is geared to producing
maximal  amounts  of relatively  undifferentiated  output  with  minimal  inputs. However,  what the
customer  wants  and what the competition  will provide  do not necessarily  mesh fully  with the
railway's  technical  production  efficiency.  Thus, by contrast,  the reshaped  railway  -- whatever
the depth of the attempted  restructuring  -- seeks to serve each market in a  manner that
maximizes  either  profits  or other  benefits  dictated  by its agreement  with  the State. Regardless- viii -
of the precise objective, a market-sensitive  railway might appear to be less "efficient" than a
well-managed monolithic entity in terms of production, and yet be much more effective in
fulfilling  its goals of improved  service  quality  and commercial  performance  because the customer
is interested in minimum  logistic costs, not just the lowest railway rates and minim"lm  service
quality.
xxvi.  For  example, a reshaped railway will typically establish separate "commercial" and
"noncommercial"  lines of business. The former would  be operated  on a commercial,  for-profit
basis and would  be self-supporting  and generally  unregulated;  the latter would  be operated  under
contract with government  at some level(s), and would receive operating subventions  under the
"public service obligation  (PSO)" rubric.  This dichotomy  would free the railway to operate as
a  commercial enterprise by reducing the  govemment's span of  control to  separable PSO
functions  only, and would encourage  both railway and govemment  to view PSO functions  as a
business relationship  between customer (i.e., govemment)  and contract supplier (the railway).
By the railway's traditional  measures  of technical operating  efficiency (e.g., coach-kilometers
per locomotive-kilometer),  the restructured services, taken together, may appear to fall below
historical  levels. This decrease, however, may mask  a host of steps taken by the respective  lines
of business to boost the responsiveness  of each service to customers' needs and willingness  to
pay.  The result should be a more profitable railway in the case of commercial  services, and
noncommercial  services that better fulfill explicit public policy objectives.
Conclusions
xxvii.  The concept  of the railway as a unitary entity  is so strong  and self-perpetuating  in many
countries as to form a roadblock against reshaping the railway in ways akin to those broached
in this paper.  Yet such reshaping  has already taken place with success in the U.S., Canada,
Japan, Sweden, Finland, Argentina, Spain, and New Zealand (among others) and offers clear
promise elsewhere. Technology,  competition,  and historical  forces have eroded the foundation
of  the  unitary  railway;  rail  entities that  are  driven by  production rather  than  market
considerations  are no longer necessary. As a result, where incremental  approaches  are feasible,
transition to some form of lines-of-business  organization  would  be a useful first step in bringing
the market to the railway.  Such a reorganization, whatever its depth, would improve market
definition  and financial  accountability  without  undue startup and transaction costs.  Following
the example of British Rail, the lines-of-business  strategy could be intensified  in stages.
xxviii.  Reshaping need  not  stop with  lines  of  business, however.  Where  incremental
approaches  have not worked, cannot work, or have reached  the limits of their effectiveness,  the
full spectrum of options exemplified  in this paper will merit careful consideration. Experience
has clearly demonstrated  the feasibility  and desirability  of mixing  and matching  these options to
fit national needs.  Experience has also shown that, despite the difficulty of making valid
generalizations, one broad statement can be made:  the monolithic railway simply does not
function well  in a market  economy  in competition  with  pnvately  owned,  properly  (i.e., lightly)
regulated  competitoir  - especially  trucking. AU  attempts  to "commercialize"  or 'corporatize,"
or to increase the role of the private sector in railway activities,  have started with one or another- ix -
form of reshaping of the railway entity.  Thus, while the detailed solution  will vary from one
country to another, as an economy  becomes  more market-driven  with wider competition  in the
transport sector, the need to reshape the monolithic railway into a market-sensitive  transport
entity remains a vital and universal objective.1
BACKGROUND: WHY RESHAPE THE RAILWAY?
Historical Context
1.  Historically, railways throughout the  world developed as  monolithic organizations,
controlling their own facilities, performing all operating and administrative functions, and
unilaterally  determining  what services to provide to an often captive  market. Such an evolution
faithfully  reflected the conditions  of the times.  In the nineteenth  century, railways represented
the vanguard  of technology; they could reliably depend  only on themselves  to produce most of
their material needs.  Moreover, as the dominant means of overland transport, railways from
their inception could essentially dictate the products they would offer (without regard to
customer  preferences)  and  the  prices  they  would  charge  (without  attention  to  cost
considerations), subject only to any available intramodal competition.  Acknowledging this
monopoly  status, regulatory structures  arose to control  it, and in many countries  perpetuated  the
illusion of monopoly  long after competing  modes  had emerged  in the transportation  marketplace.
In the socialist  economies, the adoption  of central planning  reinforced the railway as a unitary
organization. Throughout  the world, therefore, autarky and monopoly  produced and preserved
the railway monolith.
2.  In most countries, the production, market, and political conditions originally favoring
monolithic  rail transport entities no longer exist.  Although  constantly  evoiving and improving,
railway technology  is esoteric no longer.  Railways  are increasingly  able to rely on a host of
outside  suppliers  and  service  organizations  to  perform  infrastructure,  maintenance,
administrative, and  even  operating functions, as  dictated by  economic considerations."/
Moreover, in the presence of mature, competing transport modes, railways can no longer be
oblivious to customer preferences in designing services, nor can they price services without
regard to their costs. Finally, the extreme  centralization  of all economic  decisions  that formerly
characterized the socialist  states (and their railways)  is dissipating.  In light of all these changes,
the traditional  unitary railway -- in which the lowest  official  dealing  with both revenues  and costs
may well be the general manager  or the president -- has become  incongruous,  and not just from
a theoretical  viewpoint.
3.  In many countries, the mismatch  between what the railways offer and what customers
want has caused both pronounced economic inefficiencies  and severe financial strains for the
railways and their government owners.  In much of the world, the railways' losses of market
share, burgeoning deficits, and mushrooming  demands for State funding have led to enormous
pressures on governments  to effect a fundamental  restructuring  of the railway entity itself, and
of its relationship  with the State.
1/  Alice Galenson  and Louis S. Thompson,  The  Bank's  Experience  with Railway  Lending: An
Evolving  Approach,  pp. 30-31.-2  -
4.  These underlying  pressures may  manifest  themselves  in explicit  and implicit  Government
objectives  for reshaping  the railway. Typical objectives,  based on enhancing  overall economic
efficiency, may include:
5.  Promote  creative and aggressive  management. To the extent existing bureaucracies
hamper new modes of thought, reshaping the railway may be essential if new services and
operating methods are to be instituted. However, railways since the 19th Century have added
creative services  without  submitting  to fundamental  restructuring,  simply  by the accretion  of n,  /
organizations  on the old.  For example, sleeping car services over both the private carriers .a
the United States and the national railways of Europe were operated by companies especially
established  for that purpose (e.g., Pullman, Wagons-Lits),  as were many  other specialized  types
of  freight, express, and passenger services. 2'  In Europe as  elsewhere, opportunities for
creative international  and other services may exist with or without  fundamental  reshaping  of the
constituent  state railways.
6.  Free the railway to function as a market-sensitive,  commercial  enterprise.  Some
reshaping schemes relieve the railway operator of its huge fixed asset base and accumulated
long-term debt.  These actions, in conjunction  with other restructuring  techniques, may yield a
more commercially  sensitive  railway.
7.  Enhance intramodal or intermodal  transportation  competition.  Certain reshaping
options (competitive  access, for example) allow participants to expand into additional markets
while spreading  fixed costs over a wider traffic base and keeping  new investment  to a minimum.
8.  Obtain improved management  information  and performance evaluation through
financial  separation. Traditional  railway organizational  structures, as discussed  in Chapters 2
and 3, lend themselves to financial  reporting by department  rather than by service or market
segment.  Reshaping the  railway  may be  a  means (although not  necessarily the  most
cost-effective  means)  of accomplishing  a substantive  change in financial  reporting systetns. For
instance, under the "toll rail" option, assignment  of fixed plant and operational  responsibilities
to two or more separate organizations would result in the substitution  of more-or-less arm's
length transactions for internal accounting  allocations.
2/  See  Community  of European  Railways  (CER),  "Reply  of the CER  to the document  of Mr. Van
Miert (Ref: COM (89) 564 final of 1/25/90),"  in which  European  railway  management  lists
numerous  instances  of international  cooperative  freight  and  passenger  ventures  under  the existing
regime (for freight: Trans Europe Container  Express, fast, cheap and safe trains, and
Intercontainer  among  others;  for  passenger,  examples  include  EuroCity  trains,  fare and  equipment
collaborative  efforts). The CER  therefore  "calls  on the Community's  institutions  and leaders  to
ensure  that  there  is genuine  complementarity  between  the political  proposals  put forward  by the
Commission  and the often innovatory  strategies  already laid down by the railways  in their
international  fora."  See also International  Union  of Railways  (UIC), Transformation  of the
International  Railway System as Part of New European Transport  Policy.- 3 -
9.  Equalize conditions for rail vis-a-vL-  other modes.  The competition to  railways
generally operates under totally different ground rules.  Separation of  fixed facilities from
transportation  operations  and vehicle  ownership  is the norm; government  itself -- not  a subsidiary
or private enterprise -- owns and maintains the highways, waterways, or airports as public
amenities, with equal access opportunities  to all operators.  While the essential  characteristics,
capabilities,  and functions  of the ubiquitous  highway  and fixed rail modes will inevitably  differ,
policy makers in many countries perceive a need to equalize the conditions, in particular the
proportions  of fixed to variable costs (though  not necessarily  the total of both) applicable  to these
competitors.  This attempt at equalization  can take several forms:  differential fuel and other
taxes as users' fees, carefully balanced  government  subsidies,  regulatory  initiatives,  and making
the ground rules for the two modes more similar.  Under the last rubric, although highways
cannot  ordinarily be made analogous  to railways, the reverse arguably  can occur; such  a purpose
invariably  calls for reshaping  options, akin to the "toll rail" enterprise, involving  the separation
of railway operations from the fixed facility.  Sweden has effected such a restructuring  for this
reason, with the express goal of placing public policy decisions on transportation  investments
on an equal footing for the two modes.'
10.  Increase the role of the private sector in railways.  If dictated by public policy,
transfer of railways from the public to the private sector can theoretically occur in toto, by
region, by market, by function, or by some combination  of the last three factors.  Transfer by
function may have special appeal if policy makers view the railway fixed plant as part of the
inalienable national patrimony, and therefore nontransferable.  Argentina, for example, has
undertaken to award franchises on specific operations, but retains national ownership of the
rights-of-way. 4'
11.  Reduce railway deficits  and governmental  funding  burdens. As indicated  above, this
objective is of surpassing  importance  in much of the world as a motivating factor for reshaping
the railway.
12.  Foster  public policy in planning  and national  development. A country's needs for rail
service in specific markets may persistently differ from the services that the railway actually
provides.  If so, the government may have no choice but to restructure the railway so as to
fulfill the role assigned to it by national transport and development  policy.
13.  Shake the  foundations of  the  old railway order and  its  entrenched interests.
Railways are often venerable entities, with entrenched bureaucracies  in both management  and
labor,  and  among governmental regulators and  supervisory agencies.  In  the  ranks of
management, self-interest  frequently equates to preservation of existing ways of thinking and
functioning. In such cases a production rather than a profit or customer satisfaction  orientation
can plague the many layers of management. In the labor unions,  job preservation may  outweigh
3/  Stig  Larsson,  "The  Restructuring  of SJ," p. 4.
4/  Galenson  and Thompson,  op. cit., p. 32.- 4 -
considerations  of the long-term health  of the industry. Compounding  the ossification  may be an
accretion  of  governmental regulations and  implementing bureaus of  hoary  antiquity. If
management, labor, and regulators are so encrusted in their thinking and intransigent  in their
behavior  as to resist all attempts to make the railway more responsive  to modem needs for both
transportation  and fiscal responsibility,  then only a complete  upheaval  -- effectively  dismantling
the existing entity from top to bottom -- may effect the necessary changes.  Some of  the
reshaping options discussed  in Chapter 2 may provide  approaches  to achieving  such a deliberate
and controlled upheaval.  The total restructuring of the Japanese National Railways (JNR)
exemplifies  a reorganization  deliberately  undertaken  to create new railway entities in place of
the old.5'
Separation Is Not The Only Option
14.  One approach -- "separation" of fixed facility ownership from train operations  -- gained
prominence in recent years as a response to some of the objectives  above. This emphasis on
"separation" has, to some  degree, miscast  and oversimplified  the issue. In fact, a full spectrum
of options exists for reshaping the railway entity. 6'  In any country, the aptness of each option
depends on several complex factors, including the following:
15.  The relative weight  and urgency  of governmental  objectives. If totally eliminating  the
railway's operating deficit is the primary goal, then dividing the system into "commercial" and
"noncommercial"  markets  -- the latter  to be funded with  a PSO -- will help, but not  suffice.
(Uruguay, for instance -- faced with exhausted  assets, vanishing  traffic, and soaring operating
ratios and deficits -- chose to eliminate the entire passenger market in an effort to control the
railway's costs.)7'  Likewise, if governmental  development  plans call for increased industrial
development in  a  remote area  at  the end of  an unprofitable branch line,  then complete
privatization  of the rail network  will not necessarily  protect the government's  long-term  interest.
These are extreme examples illustrating a basic principle:  the form of the reshaping  must
follow its intendedfunction.
16.  The relative  importance  of the various markets  served  by the railway.  If the railway
primarily  carries  bulk  freight,  with  insignificant passenger  or  parcel  services,  then  a
5/  Kato,  Hiroshi,  Ihe Japanese  Economy  in Transition,  see especially  the appendix  "Privatization
in Japan."  See also Tanahashi, Yasushi,  Reform of Railways in Japan.
6/  This paper  focuses  on options  for reshaping  the  railway  entity  per se. For more  specifics  on the
restructuring  of relationships  between  the railway  and the  State,  see (for example)  Lee  Huff  and
Louis  S. Thompson,  Techniquesfor  Railway  Restructuring,  and  Galenson  and  Thompson,  op. cit.
7/  J.F. Berchesi,  "The Rebirth  of the Railway  in Uruguay,"  in International  Union  of Railways
(UIC), "Management  and  Policy  Studies  (MAPS),"  seminar,  Paris, September,  1989. See  also
Louis  S. Thompson  and Jorge C.  Kohon, Institutional Reform in  Iransport,  Case Study:
Uruguayan  Railway.- 5 -
lines-of-business  option may serve no purpose (unless  it can usefully  apply to submarkets  within
"bulk freight").  If  all  the  markets are  important and clearly identifiable, however, the
lines-of-business  approach may merit investigation.
17.  The available technology. Options calling for detailed cost accounting manipulations
may not prove beneficial in countries where computer installations  are nonexistent or  basic
cost-accounting  concepts are unfamiliar.
18.  The scale of railway operations  as a whole. All the reshaping  options entail startup and
transaction costs; in  smaller systems, the costs of  some reshaping options may sometimes
outweigh their benefits, however attractive  the end results may appear on paper.
19.  The administrative  capabilities  of the government  and of the railway. Creating new
structures with theoretical advantages  over the old may have negative  results if one of the new
entities is less insulated from political pressures, or  less capable of  making well-reasoned,
independent  decisions,  than was the old.  Conceivably,  a fixed facility  authority, divorced  from
the railway operator but wedded to the government, could become a convenient recipient of
largesse in the form of insufficiently  justified projects or overmaintained  permanent way.  On
the other hand, some countries may not possess sufficient depth of managerial resources to
operate a large and complex, monolithic railway.  In such cases, a judicious division into
functional and/or market-based components might yield smaUer, simpler, more manageable
entities that would better suit localy  available expertise.  Thus, the capabilities of and likely
relationships  between  the government  and the reshaped  railway  entity (or entities)  require intense
scrutiny.
20.  Moreover, in  practice,  the  vastly  complex three-dimensional matrix  of  operating
functions, service types, and geographic zones that characterizes mature railway systems may
call for a sophisticated  combination of restructuring  options, rather than for any single solution.
One option might  be chosen for freight  (or freight sub-markets),  another for intercity passenger,
and yet another for suburban passenger.  Such is the case in Japan, where a separate entity
provides freight services over the facilities  of the regional  passenger  railways that succeeded  the
Japanese National Railways (JNR), and where certain of the regional railways in turn operate
high-speed  trains over assets of the Shinkansen  Holding  Corporation. The United  States, where
separate freight, intercity passenger, and suburban  passenger  operators  have different functional
relationships in different parts of  the country, further demonstrates that complex transport
requirements may necessitate intricate schemes  for railway restructuring.
21.  Focusing on selected points on the continuum, this paper explores generic reshaping
options that can be altered or combined  to fit the unique circumstances  of particular countries
and their railway entities.-6  -
2
THE  GENERIC  OPTONS
22.  In essence, each option in  this chapter expresses a  set of relationships between the
railway entity/entities, the markets served, and the functions performed.  Today's railways
undertake a wide range of rail transportation services. Typically, this range addresses intercity
passenger, suburban passenger, and freight markets; each market can,  in  turn, be further
categorized  (for example, into "for-profit" and "not-for-profit"  segments;  by geographic  region,
line, or city-pair; by class of service for passenger, and by commodity, lading, or  service
characteristics for  freight).  In  serving these markets, regardless of  the  level of  service
differentiation,  the following  basic functions 8' must somehow  be managed:
*  Fixed facility ownership;
*  Fixed facility improvement;
*  Fixed facility maintenance;
*  Control of operations (i.e., dispatching);
*  Train movement;
*  Equipment  provision;
*  Equipment  maintenance;
*  Marketing; and
*  Financial  control and accountability.
23.  The order of the options,  as presented  below, reflects a theoretical  spectrum  ranging  from
a single entity accomplishing  aU  basic functions,  to multiple entities performing  different basic
functions. As the examples  illustrate, no such smooth continuum  exists in practice:  under the
"toll rail" option, a primary operator may fulfill all functions  for one market while providing
the fixed facility over which a secondary  operator conducts  train operations in a lesser market.
Indeed, these generic options are by no means mutually  exclusive. Even the monolithic  railway
has (in some countries) traditionally  lent itself to small-scale  "competitive  access" agreements
and, more recently, to lines-of-business  marketing  initiatives.
8/  The list of "basic  functions"  is intended  to be illustrative,  not exhaustive.  Obviously,  railway
planners  need  to accord  serious  attention  to such  other  important  functions  as stations  (which  the
Spanish  have  explicitly  and properly  addressed  in their  restructuring  plan  - see Chapter  3).- 7 -
OPrION 1:  THE MONOLTmuc  RAILWAY
24.  Over time and throughout the world, railways have typically  been integrated transport
entities, owning and operating their own fixed facilities and vehicles. 9'  Historically, these
monolithic  railways have conducted  a variety of transportation  businesses  over their fixed plants,
and have generally  lacked  precise management  information  as to the relative profitability  of these
businesses.
25.  Figure 2.1 depicts the traditional, monolithic  railway structure.  The vertical columns
represent  the three essential  markets usually  addressed  by railways; further subdivisions  are, of
course, possible (for instance, freight  into "bulk,'  "carload," "less than carload," "intermodal")
but are omitted for simplicity's sake.  Also, railways typically  have such ancillary businesses
as real estate, hotels and seaports, which are extraneous to this discussion but which may be
significant in any given country. 10'  The horizontal rows in Figure 2.1 represent the basic
functions performed in support of the railway's businesses.  In Figure 2.1 and similar charts,
boxes in the body of the schematic indicate distinct entities performing the functions and/or
services.
26.  Thus, in the traditional paradigm, a single corporate entity performs all services and
functions, without necessarily isolating the financial results of the various markets.  Such an
isolation  would  be impossible  in some  companies,  and undesirable  in others, since the status  quo
option can effectively serve to conceal cross subsidies  in several dimensions  -- not only among
service types, but among specific  lines and trains, and between  the taxpayer  at large and railway
labor.  The traditional  structure  is self-perpetuating:  by concealing  actual results, it often serves
to preserve the status quo and is generally championed  by those whose benefits exceed their
costs under the status quo.
27.  The monolithic  railway  was almost  wholly  production-oriented.  Typifying  ailing  systems
in many countries, Uruguay's railways before the restructuring  lived by "a production-oriented
rather than a  market-led philosophy in that the enterprise provided services irrespective of
market requirements  and sold products of decreasing  quality in terms of reliability, safety, and
9/  United Nations  Economic  and Social Council,  Economic  Commission  for Europe, Inland
Transport  Committee,  Principal  Working  Party  on Rail Transport,  "Draft  study (white  paper)
concerning  the development  of an international  rail transport  system  in Europe,"  p. 11.
10/ Also, railways  may even have subsidiaries  totally  divorced  from transportation,  or may use
"surplus"  capacity  of transport  assets  for unrelated  businesses,  such  as  printing  (see  Galenson  and
Thompson,  op. cit., p. 27).  Such  ancillary  businesses  can be very important: British  Rail's
surplus  in 1989/90  stemmed  entirely  from property  development,  according  to 'iR  optimistic
as it rides the storms,"  Modern Railways, August  1990,  pp. 394-395. Thus, far from being
"ancillary," consideration  of  important  side-businesses  must enter into any planning  for
restructuring.- 8 -
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punctuality [which] the  market rejected  . . .""'1  Embodying this  attitude, the  typical
monolithic railway was organized so that each functional department exercised total and
undifferentiated  responsibility  over all services.  Thus, for example, in the organization  chart
of  a  typical North American railway circa  1960, the Baltimore &  Ohio (Table 2.1),  all
"marketing" (actually "sales")  functions, for both freight and passenger, reported through a
single vice president for traffic.  All operational  functions (maintenance  of way, maintenance
of equipment, movement control, train movement, and clerical activities) reported through a
single vice president for operations  in a complex  geographical/functional  matrix. In effect, the
only person with jurisdiction over both revenues and expenses was the president of the railway
himself.  The same was true in British Rail before the 1980's, where plenipotentiary  Regional
General  Managers  and traditionally  strong  functional  hierarchies  (e.g., engineering  and  personnel
departments)  obstructed comprehensive,  market-based  business planning.  12/
OPTION  2:  L  s-OF-BUsNESS  ORGANIZATION
28.  As markets, technology, and operating practices have evolved, even on monolithic
railways, commonality has diminished to a surprising degree among many of the assets and
resources used in different markets. Thus, for instance, electrified  suburban  passenger services
employ self-propelled, multiple-unit  coaches necessitating  specialized workshops; tracks with
heavy commuter flows tend not to have much freight.  Advances in management  information
systems have, furthermore, improved the accuracy and timeliness  with which direct as well as
remaining  common  costs can be identified  with particular services. These two converging  trends
have enabled railway entities to reorganize themselves  (to varying degrees of depth) according
to lines of business so as to foster comprehensive  business  planning, market-  and cost-sensitive
decisions, and more responsive  operations for each service performed.  In essence, this is an
option for making the monolithic railway less monolithic in a service, if not in a production
sense, while reducing the entity start-up costs implicit in other alternatives.
Example: British Rail
29.  British Rail  (BR) has divided itself into five lines of business that are  financially
accountable to top management  and that "purchase" service by contract from an operating
department that is organized along a matrix of regional and functional lines.  The lines of
business  include "commercial"  InterCity, Freight, and Parcels. Noncommercial  services  include
Network SouthEast (primarily commuter)  and Provincial.  As currently structured, BR's lines
of business undertake marketing, and are financially  accountable, for their respective markets.
1/ Berchesi,  op. cit., p.2.
12/ Sir Robert  Reid, CBE, "Presentation  to the World  Bank," November  1990. For a conceptual
model of market-driven  planning,  see Neil E. Moyer and Louis S. Thompson,  Northeast
Corridor:  Achievement  and  Potential,  pp. 3-1 and 3-2.- 10-
Table 2.1
Example of Typical Monolithic Railway Orgaizatlon
(Note: Elements are presented in the exact order and hierarchy shown by the carrier.
No attempt has been made to "rationalize"  the structure  or correct "mistakes.")
Chairman
President
Law Department: Vice President  and General  Counsel
Public Relations  Department: Director
Finance and Accounting  Departments: Vice President
Treasury
Relief Department  - Employee  Benefits
Insurance
Accounting  and Freight Claim
Accounting
Freight Claim
Traffic Department: Vice President
Freight: General  Freight Traffic Manager
Freight Traffic  Manager  - Rates, System
Freight Traffic Manager  - Sales and Service, System
Freight Traffic Manager -- Eastern Region
Coal Traffic  Manager
Foreign Freight Traffic Manager
Manager, Railroad  Trailer Service
Manager, Merchandise  Traffic (less than wagon-load)
General  Perishable  and Livestock  Agent
Assistant  General  Freight Agent
Freight Traffic  Managers by [other] Region







Passenger: General Passenger  Traffic Manager
General  Passenger  Agent  - Sales, System
General Passenger  Agents in Major Traffic Generating  Points
General Passenger  Agent  - Rates, System
Advertising  Manager
General Eastern Passenger  Agent
Mail, Express, and Baggage: Manager
Superintendent,  Mail Traffic
Superintendent,  Express Traffic- 11  -
Table 2.1 (continued)
Operating  Department: Vice-President
Assistant  to Vice-President
Manager, Budget  Controls  and Statistics
General Superintendent,  Motive  Power and Equipment
Chief Engineer, Motive Power and Equipment
Manager, Research
General Superintendent,  Transportation
Chief of Yard and Terminal Operations






Manager, Highway Transportation  and Warehouses
Superintendent,  Safety  Department
Superintendent,  Floating  Equipment
New York Terminal  Region:  General  Manager
Central Region:  General  Manager
Westem Region: General Manager
Chicago  Terminal  Region: General Manager
Police:  General Superintendent
Dining Car and Commissary: Manager
Personnel Department: Vice President
Research and Development  Department: Vice President
Purchasing  Department: General  Purchasing  Agent
Source:  Adapted from the reprentation  of The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company in the Official  Guide
of the Railways, February 1959, pp. 352-353.- 12 -
While the  lines of  business perform comprehensive business planning and  define service
requirements, all facilities, equipment, and train movements remain under the aegis of the
regions, as depicted in Figure 2.2.  The result is an "appallingly  complex matrix" of internal
contracts between the people specifying  the services and those providing them.  According to
John Welsby, BR's chief executive, "we were spending  an ever-increasing  portion of our time
chasing this internal matrix around rather than addressing our attention where it really should
be -- to the needs of our passenger and freight customers." 131  Moreover, it is unclear exactly
how fixed facility costs are apportioned to the services concerned, and the degree to which
"profitable" services reflect in their internal financial  statements  the fixed  and variable costs for
the facilities they use.
30.  Whatever its drawbacks, the reorganization  of the 1980's seemingly  achieved, without
undue disruption or  startup costs, an  opportunity to  give commercial sectors a  realistic
profitability goal, and incentives  to "noncommercial"  lines of business to reduce their losses.
Having met its financia-l  objectives in the 1980's, BR reports that "the railway now costs the
taxpayer 51 percent less in  real terms than in  1982.  "14/  Even the restructured BR cannot
avoid cyclical business  swings, however: the recession-induced  results for 1990-91  have by no
means accorded with the objectives  of the current three-year  plan." 5'
31.  Spurred by the successes  of its restructuring  initiative and recognizing  its failings, BR
is now abolishing the regions totally and allocating their resources to the lines of business to
which they most closely pertain.  Where two or more lines of business make use of the same
assets or staff, the primary user will rent the property or services to secondary  lines of business
on a  "toll-rail" basis.  Thus, InterCity will "own"  King's Cross Station, London, which
Network  SouthEast  (the commuter  operator)  will share  as a "tenant." This important  elaboration
of the lines-of-business  option appears in Figure 2.3.16/
Other Examples of Lines-of-Business  Organization
32.  Viewed  in the large, the massive  restructurings  in the United States, Japan, and Canada
partake of the lines-of-business  concept  because they assign  the freight, intercity  passenger, and
13/ Richard  Tomkins,  "A  new  track  to profit  centres,"  The  Financial  7lmes  [no  date  or page  number;
presumably  June 19911.
14/ Reid,  Presentation  to The  World  Bank, p. 8. The same  author  provides  further  details  on the
internal  organization  of British  Rail in his discussion  paper,  Insi'ional  Reform  in Transport:
The  British  Rail  Experience,  pp. 20-24.
15/ "Sir  Bob  takes  the initiative  in hard times,"  Modern  Ra lways,  XLVIH  (August  1991),  393-394.
Moreover,  according  to "Misty  Vision"  in the September  1991  Railway  Gazette  International,
both staffing  levels  and  passenger  complaints  have  allegedly  shown  increases  since 1989.
16/ Tomkins,  op. cit.- 13 -
Figure 2.2
Lines-of Business Options
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Figure 2.3
Lines-of Business Options
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suburban  passenger markets to separate  institutions. More akin to the original BR approach  are
the internal reorganizations  in France (SNCF) and Spain (RENFE); the Swedish rail operator
(SJ), shorn of its fixed facilities (see below under the "toll-rail enterprise") has also organized
itself along market lines. 17'
33.  Faced with the need to consolidate the East and West German railways, a German
government commission has developed a coordinated set of restructuring proposals.  These
embody several elements of recent reshaping  schemes  elsewhere: a new State-owned  company,
Deutsche  Eisenbahn  AG (DEAG)  would "manage  and maintain  the infrastructure, receiving  fees
for its usefrom its own business groups and possibly  from other operators [emphasis  added].  "
Incorporating  aspects of the lines-of-business  and, potentially, competitive  access options, this
arrangement  would follow  the EC directive in requiring separate  cost centers and accounting  for
fixed facilities and operations, respectively.  Services would be divided along commercial/
noncommercial  lines, with the latter receiving  PSO payments  from regional and local authorities.
The commission's report does not explicitly delve into DB's overstaffing  problem, nor does it
promise to eliminate the civil service status of current employees. 18'
34.  In 1990, RENFE unveiled an ambitious restructuring  plan.  In essence, it created two
distinct types of business units (BUs):  "market" BUs to plan, market, coordinate, and be
financially accountable for the various lines of business; and "functional" BUs to perform
operations and maintenance  according to "profit performance  criteria," by agreement with the
"market" BUs. One "market" BU, High-Speed,  will exercise a greater degree of direct control
than will the others over facilities  and operations. Figure 2.4 illustrates  the Spanish  restructuring
scenario. 19'  Because the  matrix of  functional and  market business units is  innovative,
RENFE's  experience in  applying this model will spark interest among railway managers
throughout  the world.
17/ Galenson  and Thompson,  op. cit., pp. 23-24.
18/ 'Strategic report forms basis to build commercial  railway,"  Railway  Gazeue  International,
CXLVII  (September  1991),  p. 555.
19/ The figure  is extrapolated  from RENFE,  "New Corporate  Model,"  March 1990. This source
is unclear  as to the precise  span  of control  of the "high  speed"  BU  - i.e., whether  it purchases
some  services  from the functional  BUs or is entirely  insulated. The "ownership"  function  is
arbitrarily  identified  with the Infrastructure  Maintenance  and High Speed BUs; of course,
ownership  actually  rests  with  RENFE  as a whole. The  source  also  provides  an organization  chart
showing  how complex  the model  actually  is.  For example,  the BUs are grouped  into larger
"directorates"  as follows: high-speed  and suburban  each have a "directorate"  of their own;
infrastructure  maintenance,  "traffic" (operations  analysis  and control),  freight, and parcel
constitute  a third directorate;  regional  and long distance  passenger,  with station services,
constitute  a fourth;  and  rolling  stock  maintenance,  with  "traction"  (seemingly  "train  movement"),
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OpTON 3:  COMi'Errr  ACCESS
35.  Under this option, competing  railway  companies  would  have exclusive  control over some
trackage, but would also have (and give) the right of competitive  access over the trackage  of (to)
other companies.  One variation within this option would be a "regional overlap" approach,
wherein regional (or national) operators  would be given the right to operate over tracks leading
to  major traffic centers in  adjoining regions (or countries).  Smaller-scale options such as
trackage  rights  and joint  terminal agreements provide  useful practical examples of  the
competitive  access approach.
Small-Scale  Approaches  to Competitive  Access.
36.  For more than a century, railways have made use of small-scale competitive access
arrangements to reduce their operating and capital costs and to reach important markets in a
mutually beneficial manner.  Examples of these arrangements  include the following:
37.  Trackage Rights.  Table 2.2 summarizes  a typical trackage rights agreement between
the Norfolk & Western Railway ("Railway A") and another carrier ("Railway B"). It reflects,
in microcosm, the larger issues that arise in a competitive  access scenario:  assignments  of
functions and markets, costing, upgrading decisions, maintenance, operating rules, liabilities,
mechanisms  for dispute  resolution, term of the agreement,  and what happens  if the owner  wishes
to abandon the track.  The greatest level of detail in the agreement applies to liability and
procedures in  case of  abandonment.  Clearly, when separate entities are  involved, legal
complexities  multiply. (Fortunately, these are standard agreements so that legal fees, at least,
are subject to economies of  scale.  The same would not necessarly  hold true for a  major
restructuring.)20/
38.  Interchange  Agreement.  Even smaller in scope is an interchange agreement (Table
2.3), in which two railroads wishing to interchange  freight cars designate properties on which
such transfer is to  be effected and  the terms and conditions governing joint  use of  such
properties.  Again, the agreement devotes  considerable  detail to liability considerations.
39.  Joint Terminal Agreement.  A third type of small-scale  competitive  access arrangement
is a joint terminal agreement, which affords Railway B an opportunity  to make use of Railway
A's freight handling  facilities  at a particular location. The example (described  in Table 2.4) uses
a two-tiered  cost alocation appriach:  a fixed rental, based on the value of the property and the
cost of capital at that time; and a vnriable component, based on the expense of Railway A's
operating the joint terminal, shared in proportion to the tons of freight handled  by each carrier.
20/ Cf.  Daniel  L. Overbey,  Railroads:  The  Free  Enterprise  Alternative,  pp. 68-69.- 18 -
Table 2.2
Summary of Typical Trackage Rights Agreement
Basic  Concept
Railway  A allows  Railway  B to operate  its own trains  with its own  crews over a specified  portion  of
Railway  A's track.
Contents  of the Agreement:
Identification  of Trackage:
*  The  covered  trackage  is clearly  demarcated.
Railway  A Retains  All Rights:
|  *  Management  control  of, operation  over  the track.
{  *  Right  to award  trackage  rights  to third  part,  es.
Limitations  on Railway  B's rights:
* . To provide  a specific  service  only  (e.g., serve  one company).
* . No other  service  to be provided  (e.g., no other  local  freight  service  on Railway  A).
|  *  Trackage  rights  may  not be sublet  to other  railways.
Cost:
*  Base  charge:  per wagon-mile.  Amount  specified  in agreement  (23 cents).
*  Calculate  by multiplying  Railway  B's units  times  mileage  of joint trackage.
I  Escalation  clause:  per-wagon-mile  cost will  rise with inflation.
*  Accounting/billing  procedures  specified.
*  To be renegotiated  every  five  years.
0  Incidental  costs  (other  than  base  charge):  direct  labor  and  materials,  plus  established  overheads  and
equipment  rentals.
Upgrading:
* g  Railway  A may  upgrade  joint trackage  as it desires.
|  *  Improvements  made  to accommodate  Railway  B to be paid for by the latter, including  initial
capital  and incremental  maintenance  costs.
|Maintenance:
*  Will  be Railway  A's responsibility.
*  Performance  standard:  to allow Railway  B to operate 263,000  pound wagons  and six-axle
locomotives  [no  speed  standard  specified].
*  Beyond  that, condition  and availability  of trackage  not guaranteed.
*  Railway  B to hold  Railway  A harmless  for consequences  of Railway  A's failure  Fo  maintain.
*  If Railway  B pays,  Railway  A will  do more  maintenance.
Operation:
*  Railway  B to comply  with Federal  and State  safety  laws  and be responsible  for same.
*  Railway  B to comply  with  Railway  A's rules  and movement  orders.
*  Railway  B to assure  and  pay for  its employees'  qualification  to operate  over  Railway  A's trackage.
*  Railway  B to obtain  and pay for radio  equipment  for use on Railway  A.
*  Procedures  for disciplinary  actions.
*  Railway  B to pay Railway  A for any assistance  rendered  if equipment  breaks  down.- 19  -
Table 2.2 (continued)
Liabilities:
l  *  Extensive provisions,  in which all conceivable  occurrences  are provided for.
l  *  In general: Each railway is responsible  for its own losses regardless  of fault.
l  *  Labor claims to be borne by each party for its own employees, except: Employees hired by
Railway A for the benefit of Railway  B will be covered  by Railway  B.
Arbitration  Clause
Terms of Agreement; Termination; Event of Abandomnent:
|  *  Term is set at 30 years in the example.
|  *  One year's notice is required for termination  by Railway  B.
l  *  Railway A can abandon  the line; Railway  B would then have an option to purchase.
Successors  and Assigns
Source:  Norfolk &  Western Railway Company, sample trackage rights agreement with general
conditions  [no bibliographic  data available].- 20 -
Table 2.3
Summary of Typical Interchange Agreement
Basic  Concept
Railways  A and B wish to interchange  cars at a specific  location. In this example, Railway  A provides the
specific track on which such interchange  will occur.  Railway  A also permits Railway  B to operate over
so much of Railway  A as to reach the interchange  track.
Contents of the Agrement
Identification of Interchange Track
Predse Definition of Interchange:
*  Occurs when locomotive  is uncoupled  from cars left on track.
*  [Precision  is important  because of car hire charges.]
Railway A to Maintain Track
Cost Arrangement:
.!  *  Railways  A and B to split 50/50  the "annual normalized  maintenance  costs."
*  Current cost level is specified.
e  [There is no guarantee that Railway A will actually spend that money on maintenance  of the
covered trackage.]
Applicable lRules:
*  Interchange  rules of Association  of American  Railroads  (AAR).
*  Federal/State  safety rules: each party is responsible  for its own adherence  to the rules; each may
reject rolling stock not in compliance  with the rles.
Wrecks and Liabilities:
*  Complex  provisions.
*  In general, each railway is responsible  for its own rolling stock, and "no fault" applies.
Arbitration  Clause
Source:  Norfolk & Western Railway  Company,  sample  interchange  agreement.- 21 -
Table 2.4
Summary of Typical Joint Terminal Agreement
Basic  Concept
Railway  A owns  and operates  a freight  terminal  at a specific  location.  Railway  B obtains  the right  to use
this facility  jointly  with  Railway  A.
Contents  of the Agreement
Identification  of Facilities
Functional  Responsibilities:
*  Railway  A to perform  all business  and operational  functions  at the terminal.
Costs  Charged  to Railway  B (annual):
Fixed  Amount:
*  For existing  facilities,  2.5 percent  of the  value  stated  in the agreement.
*  For incremental  improvements  if made by Railway  A, 3.5 percent  of their  value.
Variable Amount:
*  Railway  A's Costs  to be AUlocated:
* Train  movements  within  terminal  (including  salaries  for switching  forces).
* Taxes  and assessments.
* Salaries  of agents  and clerks.
* Utilities  for buildings.
* Maintenance  of covered  properties.
*  Allocation  Basis:
* Proportion  of each  railway's  freight  tonnage  to total  freight  tonnage  handled  at terminal
in any month.
Accounting  and Billing  Procedures
Liabilities:
*  As usual, provisions  are complex.
*  Each  party  is generally  responsible  for loss  and damage  which  is the fault  of its sole employees
or of defects  in its own  equipment.
*  But: if loss or damage  is caused  by agents  or employees  involved  in the  joint operation,  then
no-fault  prevails.
Default  and Termination;  Arbitration
Note:  Not only does  Railway  A fail to assure  that it will  handle  B's traffic  with the same  dispatch  as
its own, it makes  itself  non-liable  for any deficiency  or act done  or omitted  by A's agent  with
respect  to B's business.
Source: Pittsburgh,  Chartiers  & Youghiogheny  Railway  Co. and Pittsburgh  & Lake  Erie Railroad  Co.,
joint terminal  agreement  for McKees  Rocks,  Pennsylvania,  August  1, 1902.- 22 -
40.  Joint Switching  Agreement. Finally, the joint switching  agreement described  in Table
2.5 has particular relevance  because it rotates responsibility  for all switching  at a particular  plant
among three carriers.  This is one self-balancing  technique  to counteract the natural tendency,
on the part of the entity in control at any given time, to give preferences to its own operations.
41.  Advantages of Small-Scale Options.  These small-scale  options developed  because they
mutually  benefitted  aU parties concerned: were the benefit not mutual, such agreements  would
not have been signed or carried out between  private, for-profit  carriers. With the traffic of more
than one carrier  concentrated on  a  single facility, fixed maintenance, transportation, and
investment costs could be spread over a larger traffic base, thus contributing  to the landlord
railway's profitability.  The tenant, for its part, could enter new markets without making the
capital investments  that a duplicate facility would otherwise  require.  Such arrangements  often
yielded enhanced competition in the transportation marketplace -- a benefit to shippers and,
allegedly, to  the public.  Since these small-scale options usually spawned no  new, large
corporate  entities, the startup  costs were low and implementation  could occur relatively  quickly.
42.  Administratively simple, inexpensive, and beneficial to aU parties directly involved,
trackage rights and other joint agreements offer intriguing options for application  on a larger
scale as  part of national restructurings. The examples  below rely heavily on trackage rights as
a basis for large scale competitive  access scenarios.
Large-Scale Paradigm.
43.  Building  on the smaUer-scale  competitive  access concepts  described  above, the paradigm
in Figure 2.5 assumes a national railway comprising  largely autonomous  regions, exemplified
by Regions A, B, and C.  Each region behaves like a separate corporation  that contains, on the
one hand, line-of-business  profit centers and,  on the other, a cost center that controls and
maintains  the fixed facility and charges the lines of business for its use.  Internal  charges are set
so that the fixed facility cost center breaks even.
44.  The large half-tone  dots in Figure 2.5 are traffic generating  nodal points.  Via trackage
rights and appropriate terminal arrangements, each regional railway provides service at least
over all the links for which its nodes are endpoints,  and possibly beyond. Thus, between major
traffic generating centers, one or  more additional regional railways (beyond the  "owning"
regional railway) would be authorized  to market and haul traffic.  (is  illustration  is based on
trainload  freight between the traffic  generation  points.)  To assure competition,  the fixed facility
cost center in Region A exacts the same user charges  from the Region A profit centers as it does
from those of Regions B and C, and so forth in the other Regions.  I  this way each major
transportation market  can  have  competitive service throughout much of  the  network. 21'
Shippers would, of course, have the right to designate  which railway would handle their traffic
between the competitive  nodal points.
21/ Most  intraregional  freight  would  still  be captive  to one  regional  carrier;  where  truck  competition
is weak  or non-existent,  the regional  railway  would  still  exercise  a monopoly  over such  traffic.
Hence  the regulatory  concerns  addressed  below.- 23 -
Table 2.5
Summary of Typical Joint Switching Agreement
Basic  Concept
Railways  A, B, and C agree  to share  the switching  responsibilities  at a major  industrial  plant;  each road
will do the switching  for all three, for a four-month  period. [Ownership  of the track  here is evidently
divided  between  the  plant,  and Railways  A, B, and C.]
Contents  of the Agreement
Identification  of Facilities
Responsibility  of the Switching  Railway:
*  Provide  crews  and locomotives  and switch  all cars to, from, and  within  the  plant.
*  The switching  road  will 'give no preference"  to its own  traffic. [The  rotational  scheme  helps  to
assure  this;  see text.]
Revenues:
*  Will  always  accrue  to the carrier  on whose  behalf  the  cars are switched.
Expenses:
*  Variable  costs  only  are allocated.
*  Costs  covered:
*  Engines  and supplies  at standard  rate (here  $7.50/hour).
*  Engines  and switching  crews:  standard  rate paid  each  employee.
*  Allocation  formula: Based  on each  road's projected  share  of loaded  cars.
Liabilities:
*  Very  complex;  occupies  50 percent  of agreement's  length  and  provides  for every  contingency.
*  Under  certain  circumstances,  liability  is allocated  in proportion  to car counts  for the six months
preceding  an accident.
Source:  Wheeling  & Lake  Erie  Railway  Co., Pennsylvania  Railroad  Co., and  Baltimore  & Ohio  Railroad
Co., joint switching  agreement  for Massillon,  Ohio,  July 20, 1932.Figure  2.5
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45.  Such a paradigm may be particularly appropriate in countries with heavy rail freight
densities and virtually no competing  transportation  modes. In addition, the competitive  access
model  can be applied to groups of countries,  the national  railways of each would function as the
"regional" entities assumed in the paradigm.
46.  Over a broad range of applications, this paradigm evokes two critical issues:  trackage
use charges and regulation.
47.  Trackage  use charges.  Both the structure and level of the trackage fees will be
important in determining how well this approach would work.  If the fee levels are too high
(reflecting inefficiency  in the cost of providing capacity), then traffic will be depressed.  The
identical "tolls" for all users would provide some incentive for the owning railway to control
its costs. Similarly, the development  and publication  of comparative  maintenance  cost statistics
among the regional railways would identify poor performers and lead to pressure from the
marketing  departments. No matter what else happens, the principle must be established  that the
fixed facility cost centers must recover from users all their costs (so that fee levels are not too
low).  As explained  in detail under "technical considerations"  in Chapter 3, the fee structure
is vital because it can determine the way in which the operators perceive their incentives to
design services, load wagons, organize trains, and so forth.  For example, a fee structure based
on axles (weighted  by tonnes per axle), trains, and track usage time (weighted  by peak hours
versus off-peak hours) would  provide an incentive to run heavy wagons (subject  to the axle load
weights), long trains, adequate power (in order to reduce running time and the costs of delay
due to locomotive  failure), and at the right times (due to peak charges).  To be fair, the fixed
facility cost center would  probably have to provide a rebate based on the number of minutes  of
delay caused by problems (dispatching  errors, track maintenance,  signal failure, and the like)
which were not the fault of the train operator.  By contrast, a fee structure solely based on
wagon-kilometers  (as is common in the U.S.) would reduce the incentive to run long and full
trains.
48.  Regulation.  Depending  on the economic  conditions and transportation  environment  of
the country or  countries adopting this paradigm -- in particular, if no inter- or intramodal
transportation competition to the state railway now exists -- rate and service regulation may
prove necessary.  This regulation might base itself on such principles as the following:
*  Non-discrimination  between  essentially  similar  shippers  under  similar
circumstances  (useful in principle, although  almost unenforceable  in practice);
*  No single rate can exceed its variable (avoidable)  cost by an excessive amount
without good reason.  In the U.S.,  this amount is  100 percent (i.e.,  the rate
cannot be more than twice the variable cost), but almost any other target can be
established.
*  The overall rate of return earned by the regional railway as a whole would have
to be at or near the opportunity  cost of capital.- 26 -
49.  Furthermore, the national government(s)  might have to determine which railways may
serve which  n.arkets. Even with this implied  level of governmental  interference, the competitive
access paradigm could lead to more competition  and more effective  railway management  than
presently  exist in countries  with heavy freight  densities  and virtually  no competing  transportation
modes.
European Community Directive
50.  Containing  elements of several reshaping options, the European Community directive
most closely  resembles  the competitive  access paradigm. Each country would  carve out its fixed
facility either as a separate entity or as a distinct cost center; in either case, the State would
ensure non-discriminatory, equitably priced access to its railway network for  "international
groupings of railway undertaldngs,  and for railway undertakings  engaged in the international
combined transport of goods."  In other words, competitive  access would have to be provided
for international traffic. 22'  The directive also addresses concerns common to  railway re-
structurings throughout  the  world:  for  example,  the  separation of  commercial and
noncommercial  services  and the provision  of public service  obligation  grants by the State or local
authorities,  the  enhancement of  railway  managers'  commercial  orientation,  and  the
rationalization  of the railway's debt structure to strengthen the autonomous  management  of the
railways.23/
51.  The proposals antecedent to the EC directive engendered controversy. The concept of
the  monolithic railway as  an integrated organism, in  which a  central controlling "brain"
regulates all "bodily" functions, inheres in many railway managers and experts.  Indeed, the
organic concept  underlies the negative  reply of the Community  of European Railways  (CER) to
the European  Commission  Communication  on a Community  railway policy. In itself, according
to the CER, the proposed separation of fixed plant from operations  "does not . . . justify a
full-scale  debate." Citing  the "grave implications"  of the Commission's  proposal, the CER goes
on to say:
Unlike other modes of transport, the rail system is an integrated system. All the means
of production  are managed  accordingly. The separation, other than in accounting  terms,
of rail infrastructure and rail services calls for very detailed consideration  of . . . legal
status, financial  liability, planning, responsibility  for services, and relations between the
infrastructure management  and  the operator.  Different criteria  . . . apply in  each
Community member State.
52.  Similarly, the CER inveighs against the competitive  access element of the proposal.
22/ Council  of the European  Communities,  "Council  Directive  of 29 July, 1991,  on the development
of the Community's  Railways,'  Preamble  and  Articles  1, 8, and 10.
23/ Ibid., Articles  5 and  9.- 27 -
Access should  be restricted  to undertakings  which  bring genuine added value to the
railway system ...  The majority of Community  rail networks  are not yet convinced  that
such a proposal would have beneficial consequences  for the operation of the European
netwyork. 24'
53.  By way of a counterproposal,  the CER points to the existing  European subsidiaries  (e.g.,
Intercontainer, InterfrigoP)  to show that options short of competitive  access, and under the
aegis of the existing railways, are fully available to meet the objectives set by the Community
proposal.
Implications of Competitive Access
54.  The concept of expanded access to rail facilities theoretically represents a spectrum
ranging  from  commonplace, highly  controlled  arrangements (e.g.,  trackage  rights)  to
uncontrolled  competition  for available capacity.
55.  The latter is indeed an extreme.  Totally free access, in which vehicles operated by
different entities present themselves  randomly for passage over a given railway link, will not
work because:
A railway's capacity is determined  not just by endpoint terminal "slots" but by
mine  capabilities,  which are always limited by the number of tracks, the spacing
and  configuration ,f  interlockings and line junctions, the  signalling system,
differential  time/distance  curves of various service types, and related  physical and
operational factors.  While the theoretical capacity of a line segment may be
great, its ability to accommodate  a given type of service making given stops at
a particular time of the day may be limited in the extreme.
*  Thus, introduction of random vehicles into a  necessarily carefully scheduled
railway operating plan will result in inevitable  and material delays.
*  While  a single entity exercising  complete  control over facility  and operations  may
make advance policy decisions that would allow unscheduled operations and
pre-plan the effects of consequent  delays, and while multiple entities can agree
in advance on policies for dealing with scheduled  services, totally free access in
a railway setting  would result in regular infringements  by independent  entities on
each other's operations  and could degenerate  into unacceptable  service levels for
all.
24/  Community  of European  Railways  (CER),  "Reply  of the CER  to the document  of Mr. Van  Miert
(Ref.  COM  (895)  564  final  of 1/25/90),"  p. 10.
25/ It is interesting  to note, in passing,  that  these  entities,  the existence  of which  the CER supports,
themselves  represent  departures  from the monolithic  railway.- 28 -
56.  The specter of  disorganization  -- so foreign to  the organic concept of  the railway,
discussed  above - underlies the CER's obvious  disdain for competitive  access. However, since
competitive  access is a continuum of possibilities, the options need not totally undermine the
central control of railway operations.  When the EC directs that access to  member States'
railways be accorded to international  traffic,26 it does not specify that the access shall be "on
any terms" or haphazard in any way.  The Swedish restructuring  explicitly allows for a form
of competitive  access at some time in the future: "As a government  agency  Banverket  must plan
for a neutral treatment of different transport companies, which may become competitors for
future access to the tracks.  "27'  "Neutrality" in this context does not necessarily  connote a lack
of discipline. Finally, although  Isabel  Benham  promotes  a revolutionary  "open access" concept
to be applied throughout the United States, her idea of a  "Roadway Corporation" to own,
maintain, and manage  the fixed facilities  still preserves  a high degree of centralized  control over
train operations. 28/
57.  Competitive  access to rail facilities is not a new concept, as the examples  indicate. The
trackage rights agreements dating to the nineteenth century represented attempts by railway
companies to expand beyond their physical limitations.  As railway restructuring proposals
become larger in scale, competitive  access will become more feasible.  Yet however free the
access, considerable  planning  of train operations and detailed protocols for resolving conflicts
will still be necessary because of the inherent nature of the railway.
OpIoN  4:  THE "WHOLESALR"
58.  Functioning  as a "wholesaler," the railway  entity could own  and operate the fixed facility
and perform all operations  on behalf  of marketing  entities  which would be the "retailers.  "  This
would mean that the railway itself would only haul trains; it would target its marketing  efforts
at retailers, not at shippers. It might furnish some, or all, of the rolling stock and crews, at the
retailer's choice. Figure 2.6 displays  a "wholesaler" option; many variations on the theme are
possible, even over a single railway.
59.  For instance, American President Lines (APL) functions  as a transportation "retailer,"
marketing the business (double-stack  containers), collecting the revenues, and dealing with
shippers. The performing  railway hauls complete  APL trains, provides  crews and locomotives,
and charges APL.  In Australia, a number of freight forwarders function as retailers using the
state railways'  "wholesale" services.  As multimodal transport providers, these forwarders
conduct a large, deregulated  trucking business. They control their own rail terminal and yard
26/ Council  of the European  Communities,  op. cit., Preamble  and Article  1.
27/ Banverket,  "Information  about  the new  Swedish  National  Rail  Administration,"  p. 3.
28/ Isabel  Benham,  "Open  Access: A Concept  for the Railroad  Industry's  Survival."- 29 -
Figure 2.6
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operations  and negotiate  on the open market with the railways  to charter unit trains with agreed-
upon service specifications.  As a  result, despite a  state monopoly on railway ownership,
competition  among these efficient intermodal "retailers" flourishes. 29'
OPTION  5:  TIlE "TOLL RAIL" ENTERPRISE
60.  Under  this option, the entire  fixed facility  (track, signals,  communications,  electrification,
and so forth), except for exclusive facilities, would be the property and responsibility of one
owner.  There would  be one or more authorized  user(s), each of which would pay tolls for use
of the facility.  In some forms of this option, the tolls would be public and nondiscriminatory,
but might well vary by train size, axle load, direction of travel, time of day, season, and similar
criteria.  In a sense, the "toll rail" enterprise would be much like a regulated  public utility. 30
61.  Although the "toll rail"  may well include elements of  "competitive  access" and vice
versa, the two approaches  differ in emphasis: under the "toll rail" approach, separate entities
provide the fLxed  facility and conduct operations, whereas under "competitive  access," more
than one entity operates in a given market over a particular fixed facility.
62.  Examples of the "toll rail" option range from Sweden, which has completely sundered
fixed facility  from operating  functions,  to the United States  and Japan, which have  very complex
arrangements  containing  significant "toll rail" components, at least in certain regions.  In none
of these examples  does competitive  access play a large-scale  role, although  Sweden is studying
the possibility.
Sweden
63.  In  July  1988, Sweden embarked on a  very ambitious restructuring centering on  a
complete  separation  of fixed facility  from operating  functions  -- a pure example of the "toll rail"
option.  As shown in Figure 2.7,  a facility entity (Banverket) now owns and maintains all
railway track in the country.  The Swedish State Railways (SD)  has become an operator only,
with responsibility  for all commercial  passenger and freight services, as well as the mandate  to
operate such noncommercial  freight, intercity passenger, and commuter services as national  or
local authorities  do not elect to operate themselves  or under contract to others.  Reorganized  on
a  lines-of-business basis, SJ will not provide non-commercial services unless appropriate
subsidies  are paid by the cognizant  government  authorities. In theory, an opportunity  exists for
29/  Theodore  Keeler, Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy, p. 131.
30/ For typical  "toll  rail" proposals,  some  of which  contain  competitive  access  elements,  cf.: Daniel
L. Overbey,  Railroads:  the  Free  Enterprise  Alternative,  pp. 127  ff.;  D. Daryl  Wyckoff,  RaUroad
Management,  pp. 130  ff.; and Benham,  op. cit.  In the United  States,  this concept  entered  (at
least  "cursorily")  into  the  Preliminary  System  Plan  developed  in response  to the Northeastern  rail
crisis of the 1970's (see Eric W. Beshers, Conrail: Government  Creation  and Privatization  of
an American Railroad, ch. VI, p. 4).- 31 -
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competitive  access  in the new  Swedish  arrangement;  in one of fifteen  regions,  SJ in fact  lost the
tendering  of the 1989 service  contract  to a small, private operator. 31 SJ and the private
operator  are not, however,  directly  competing  against  each  other  in that  region  for that market.
64.  The documentation  from Sweden 32 suggests  that the prime purpose  for effecting  the
separation  was to place the railways conceptually  on the same footing as roads, so that
investment  and maintenance  decisions  would  take  into account  the full range  of public  costs  and
benefits.
65.  Although  long-term  trends have not yet emerged, SJ has apparently  upgraded its
productivity  and financial  performance  since the restructuring  occurred. 33'  The Swedish
Government  plans to complete  a major assessment  of its new policy in  1992,34'  and has
recently  instructed  the Banverket  to investigate  the possibility  of reintroducing  competition  into
the rail sector. 35/
Japan
66.  The documentation  for the April 1987  restructuring 36' points to its underlying  goal:
to create  a cataclysm  so complete  in the JNR that the latter's intractable  problems  of excess
labor, bloated size, and flabby management  would disappear  in favor of smaller, leaner
organizations,  most of which would  have hope for profitability. The -toll rail" was a key
element  of this complex  plan; the basic  structure,  as diagrammed  in Figure  2.8, consists  of six
regional  owner/operators  that are both facility  entities  and operators  of the prinary service,
intercity  passenger. A single  national  freight  operator  operates  on trackage  rights  over the six
regional  railways;  payments  are calculated  separately  for the major  facility  components.  Pure
separation  of fixed  facility  ownership  from operation  occurs  only  with  respect  to the high-speed
lnes, which  the separate  Shinkansen  Holding  Corporation  owns  and  leases  back  to the  passenger
railways. Improvement  projects  extending  the Shinkansen  system  are the responsibility  of the
Japan  Railway  Construction  Corporation. 37/
31/  Stig Larsson, "The Restructuring  of SJ," p. 4.
32/  See the long list of references for Sweden in the bibliography. In particular, the works of Lars
Hansson describe the theoretical  and ideological  underpinnings  of Sweden's complete  separation
of fixed plant from operations.
33/  Galenson and Thompson, op. cit., p. 23.
34/  Jan Brandborm  and Lars Hellsvik, "The New Railway  Policy in Sweden: Separation  of Network
and Operations,"  p.  10.
35/  Jan-Eric Nilsson, letter to Jose Carbajo.
36/  See, in particular, Yasushi Tanahashi, Reform of RaUlways  In Japan, and Hiroshi Kato, The
Japanese  Economy  in Trans1on.
37/  "Shinkansen  extensions  to go ahead," Railway Gazete Intnaional,  CXLVII  (September  1991),
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67.  Sufficient time has not elapsed to judge whether this total restructuring wiUl  achieve
success. However, the results for the first three years afford some encouragement. First, the
three  commercial intercity railways are  showing operating profits  higher than originaly
projected.  For  these companies, there is hope that commercial management  principles are
indeed flourishing. Second, the freight railway appears to be at least marginally profitable. 3 8'
Third, total employment has declined drastically from the JNR days.  And fourth, anecdotal
evidence suggests that attitudes among the staff have matured from the days of  the JNR
"unsinkable  ship" -- a prerequisite  to the marketing  sensitivity  that  must precede  railway survival
and growth in societies  that present the public with other transportation  options.
68.  The critical test for the JNR restructuring  is not whether the commercial  networks can
endure -- they seem to be self-sufficient  for the time being -- but whether the noncommercial
networks can survive on the interest from the "stabilization fund" that endows their public
service obligation.  Thus far the three island companies have generated deficits which were
manageable  on the income from their "endowment.  "  Yet two out of the three island companies
did not fully meet the financial targets of  the reform plan; traffic levels have not  shown
satisfactory increases; and depopulation  and road improvement  continue on the islands.  Still
another goal of the restructuring, repayment of the long-term debt, has lagged.  In sum, the
reshaping of Japan's  railways has produced results warranting guarded optimism for the
moment. 39'
United States:  Amtrak
69.  Viewed  in the large, the situation  in the United States  has gradually  evolved since the late
1960's into a lines-of-business  structure, with different  entities addressing  different markets and
considerable  intramodal  competition  remaining  in the freight market. Elements  of the "toll rail"
option pervade the new structure, nevertheless.
70.  In most of the country, the facility  owner/operators  are the freight ailways, with Amtrak
using trackage rights or  paying fees as  a  secondary operator. In  the Northeast Corridor,
however, the situation is more complex.  There, three primary facility entities exist:  Amtrak
south of New Rochelle,  New York, and between  New Haven, Connecticut  and the Massachusetts
state line;  the States of New York and Connecticut, represented by Metro North and the
Connecticut Transportation Authority, between New Rochelle and  New Haven;  and  the
Commonwealth  of Massachusetts  for the portion of the line in its territory.  Commuter  operators
abound in this region and are very important over much of the line; their influence over the
facility varies.
38/ Galenson  and  Thompson,  op. cit., Annex  B, pp. 59-62.
39/ For a measured  appreciation  of those  results,  see  Tanahashi,  op. cit., pp. 24 ff.  It is significant
to note  that  the Shinkansen  Leasing  Corporation  is  being  terminated  and  the lines  divided  among
the three  using  railways,  apparently  because  the expected  benefits  of the leasing  arrangement  did
not  justify  the added  complexity  of the arrangement  (p. 22).- 35 -
71.  Overall, this "restructuring" -- achieved  by fits and starts over a 20-year period, with no
preordained  master  plan -- has fulfilled  the very important  goals  of separating  the responsibilities
for different types of services, assigning common  costs by negotiation, and revealing, at least
grossly, the transport economics  of the lines of business involved. With regard to the intercity
passenger market, Amtrak has improved the percentage of costs covered by revenues, and in
many submarkets (particularly in  the Northeast Corridor) has upgraded service,  sometimes
dramatically. From a service standpoint  nationwide,  however, perfection  has yet to be attained.
Whether the system is providing the quality and quantity  of transport that national  policy would
demand is unknown, since national  policy toward Amtrak tergiversates  between the Executive
and Legislative  branches. For the freight railways, now relieved of a passenger burden which
most found more unprofitable  than freight, the partial separation  of fixed plant from operations
has proven very beneficial.
Canada: VIA
72.  In 1977, Canada created VIA, a crown corporation  charged with intercity rail passenger
service throughout the Dominion.  (Regional carriers continue to  operate some provincial
services.)  Like much of Amtrak, VIA operates over trackage owned and controlled by the
freight railways, Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP).  From the CN/CP
perspective, VIA has accomplished  its chief goal -- extricating  the railways from the passenger
business and its associated  deficits. However, VIA's troubled history, lack of long-term policy
guidance  and legislative  authority, and recent service reductions  offer no clear prognosis for the
future of intercity rail passenger service in Canada.Y'
40/  Galenson  and Thompson,  op. cit., p. 22.- 36 -
3
IssuEs AND  TECHNICAL  CONSIDERATIONS
73.  The government  objectives  exemplified  in Chapter 1 give rise to a series of issues
reflecting  both actual  experience  and a priori analysis. As evidenced  by successful  initiatives
in such  countries  as the United  Kingdom,  Canada,  Japan, Spain,  and the United  States,  these
issues  raise  no  insuperable  obstacles  to reshaping  the  railway.  They  do, however,  provide  a basis
for characterizing  each generic option  for its responsiveness  to national  goals. This chapter
concludes  with a discussion  of two topics  which,  although  technical  in nature,  have  important




74.  Whether  the intent  of the reshaping  effort is to convert  the railway  into a commercial
enterprise,  to enhance  competition,  to simply  reduce  the funding  burden,  or all three, proper
business  planning  requires  a clear understanding  of the railway's  markets  and their  commercial
potentials  (if any).  Market  definition  implies  an appreciation  of what  the markets  are  and where
they are tending with respect to traffic trends, developments  in competing  modes,  changing
demographics,  and economic  development  plans. Unless a reshaping  plan incorporates  this
degree  of understanding,  the  production-oriented  railway  will  persist,  thus  thwarting  fundamental
restructuring  efforts.
75.  Table  3.1 therefore  assesses  how  well each  generic  option  lends  itself  to identifying  and
analyzing  the railway's  major  markets.
Financial  Accountability
76.  Knowing  what the markets  are provides only incomplete  information  for business
planning  and management.  In order  to identify  commercially  viable  services,  to  profitably  tailor
services  to market  demand,  and to intelligently  conduct  and improve  daily  operations,  railway
managers  need  to know  and exercise  control  over both revenue  and expense  characteristics  of
each  market. Accountability  for  both  costs  and  income  is essential  to the market-driven  railway.
77.  The traditional monolithic  railway, by  contrast, ordinarily fails to  provide for
accountability  on a market-by-market  basis;  it does not even  generate  the accurate  knowledge
that is prerequisite  to accountability.  (Before  restructuring,  BR could not provide  reasonable
financial  performance  indicators  for  the  regional  general  managers  because  of irremediable  flaws- 37 -
Table 3.1
Characterization  of Generic Options Based on Market Definition
(Ratings  are H=High, M=Medium, or L=Low.)
Option  Rafn  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status quo)  L  Traditional departmental organization makes it
difficult  to differentiate  functions
(2)  Lines-of-business  organization  H  Differentiation  by market is the very raison d'etre
of the lines-of-business  organization.
(3)  Competitive  access  M  Wil  vary  with  the  specific  option  selected.
Trackage  rights exchanges  between  two monolithic
railways, in the absence  of market  differentiation,
can still be considered 'competitive access".
(4)  "Wholesaler"  H  In this option, the "retailers" must concentrate  on
particular markets.
(5)  "Toil rail" enterprise  M  While "toil rail" type arrngements  customarily
include market differentiation  on the part of the
operating railway,  such a  split between fixed
facility  and operaing functions  could still occur in
the  absence  of  a  lines-of-business approach.
Again,  it  would  depend  on  the  specific
circumstances.
in the allocation techniques. 411)  While identification  of revenues with markets should present
few problems (because a paper trail normally links receipts with the type of transportation
provided), a monolithic railway can assign costs to markets only with the greatest difficulty
41/ Reid,  op. cit., p. 2. 'The Regions  were  not  separate  businesses  with  profit  accountability.  Their
revenues  and costs  were only those  which  originated  within  the boundaries  of their  territories,
and since many passenger and freight trains moved between  Regions, there were major
discrepancies  in revenue  and cost attribution.  Moreover,  until 1983,  infrastructure  costs  were
allocated  from the annual  total on a route-mile  basis, no matter  whether  a length  of track  had
been  renewed  or was scheduled  for renewal. So while  the command  structure  of the Regional
General  Manager  system  was strong,  the business  basis  of their  operations  was weak."- 38 -
because of the allocation methodology  involved.  Figure 3.1 shows those cost areas which a
tradidonal railway can relatively easily isolate by function and service, and those which are not
so easily done. In particular, facility-related  costs require allocation,  which  is at best theoretical
(since it  reflects no  arm's  length transaction) and which requires sophisticated analytical
techniques to be of genuine helpfulness to  management  and the owners.  This is  why the
objective of  "improved management information" (cf.  Chapter 1) may require a complete
restructuring of the railway entity under certain circurntances.
78.  The monolithic railway therefore ranks poorly on Table 3.2, which characterizes the
degree to which each generic option would encourage accountability  on a market-by-market
basis.
Operations  Coordination
79.  Some  of the generic options  involve multiple  entities  in operations, thus undermining  one
of the clear advantages  of the monolith  -- its ability to solve conflicts  by command. Operating
conflicts are indeed inevitable when two carriers use the same fLxed  facility.  Even when
operators are geographically  separated (for instance, commuter  services at city A and at city B
on the through intercity line AB), their schedules  can conflict because of impacts on and from
through services.  These facts require the  institutional plan for reshaping the railway to
incorporate mechanisms that will prevent or reduce operating conflicts, or which will cause
people and organizations  to look beyond their immediate  gains to longer-term  impacts  of selfish
behavior.
80.  While the appropriate mechanism  will depend on the specific situation  in the country at
hand, planners may wish to emulate existing approaches.  On the Northeast Corridor, which
belongs to several owners and serves various commuter and freight operators  and one intercity
passenger operator, a train planning unit emerged in the late 1970's to work out scheduling
problems for all users before they became operating problems.  Where two entities jointly use
a  facility, a rotating responsibility for  movement control may act to  curb  the  short-term
tendencies  of the controlling organization  to afford operating  preference to its own trains.  This
self-balancing  mechanism is the plan for the new Harold Tower, a shared facility between
Amtrak and the Long Island Rail Road.  The former Washington  Terminal Company,  jointly
owned by  competing railways until  1971, had rotating personnel in  certain management
positions.  The joint switching  agreement described in Chapter 2 provided for each of three
railways to switch a major industry  for four-month  intervals. Not only did the agreement state
the admirable principle that all traffic would be handled equitably, but the rotation provision
could act as a powerful motivation  against infringements  of the principle.
81.  Table 3.3 evaluates  each option in terms of its implied ease of operations coordination
through  prevention and resolution  of conflicts. Based  on the available  mitigating  measures, this
issue clearly poses no threat to railway restructuring.- 39 -
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Table 3.2
Characterization  of Generic Options Based on Financial Accountability
(Ratings  are H=High, M=Mediurn,  or L=Low.)
Option  Rating  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status  quo)  L  Too  many  non-arm's  length  cost  allocations are
necessary, as depicted  in the chart.
(2)  Lines-of-business  organization  M or L  If the lines of business are merely superimposed  over
the existing  regional/functional  matrix,  then allocations
will still be necessary.
(3)  Competitive  access  M or L  In  some  versions,  monolithic railways  may  be
exercising access over each other, so that allocations
will be required.
(4)  "Wholesaler-  M  While  the existence  of retailers will necessitate  market
differentiation,  transportation  may still be provided  by
traditional  monolithic  carriers.
(5)  "Toll rail'  enlerprise  H  The separation of fixed plant and operating  functions
will absolutely  necessitate  arm's-length  transactions  for
fixed facility  cost assignment.
Table 3.3
Characterization  of Generic Options Based on Ea-e of Operations Coordination
(Ratings  are H=Hligh,  M=Med;um, or L=Low.)
Option  Rating  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status  quo)  H  Entire entity is under unified, authoritarian  control.
(2)  Lines-of-business  organization  M  Varies  with depth of lines-of-business  organization. If
the underlying railway is monolithic, then operations
coordination should be easy.  As lines of business
acquire  asets  and  act  independently, operations
coordination  may become somewhat  more difficult.
(3)  Competitive  access  M  Each segment  of railway may  stiUl  be under monolithic
control; conflicting  user needs and desires could stiU
lead to conflict.
(4)  "Wholesaler"  M  The railway itself may remain monolithic; the large
retailers, depending on  the functions t} v perform,
could create conflict.
(5)  -Toll rail  enterprise  L  Total  finctional  separation could  lead  to  built-in
operating  conflicts,  requiring  institutional  mechanisms
for resolution.- 41 -
Intramodal  Competition
82.  In  certain countries,  railways  maintain a  monopolistic position. 42 Where  such
monopolies  exist, the quickest way to effect transport competition  would often be to introduce
it within the rail mode itself.  Such a step could foster responsiveness  to user needs, spur
technological modernization and service innovation, and instill an entrepreneurial spirit in
railway management. Some of the generic options,  in particular  competitive  access, would  offer
opportunities for healthy intramodal rivalry.  Table 3.4 rates the generic options on  their
responsiveness  to this issue.
Appropriate  Maintenance Levels
83.  A scenario for railway restructuring  should encourage maintenance  of the fixed facility
at exactly the level of utility required to serve the markets - no more, and no less.  This
requires forethought because some generic options may increase the number of entities and
government  agencies  participating  in rail transport  decisions.  In turn, each of these  participants
may have inherent short- and long-term confhicts  of interest with respect to  defining and
protecting the capabilities  of the permanent way.  As a result, in crafting  a solution for a given
country, planners need to envision these conflicting  viewpoints so as to set them in equipoise.
Table 3.5 assesses the generic options for their amenability  to a balanced maintenance  regimen.
This intricate yet important topic receives further treatment under "technical considerations"
later in this chapter.
Track Maintenance  Coordination with Operations
84.  Just as the multiplication  of operators can set the stage for disputes among them, the
separation of fixed facility from movement functions may draw attention to the competing
requirements  of plant maintenance  and train operations. Indeed, situations  involving  a primary
owner/operator  (Railway  A) and a secondary  operator (Railway  B) imply a three-way conflict:
between A's  and B's  train movements; between A's  maintenance function and  B's  train
movoments;  and, intenally, between A's train movements  and maintenance  function. Whatever
the specifics, a restructuring  scenario should anticipate  confficts  of this nature and incorporate
mechanisms  to prevent and resolve them. Since this issue (although  important  in its own right)
resembles the "operations  coordination" question, the characterizations  of the options in Table
3.3 apply here as well.
42/ In particular, Galenson  and Thompson  (Annex 3,  Table 3)  show that in  five socialist
countries  - Romania,  the USSR,  Czechoslovakia,  China,  and  Poland  - rail  holds  a share  of from
74 to 94 percent  of the total  rail-plus-truck  freight  market.- 42 -
Table 3.4
Characterization  of Generic Options Based on Intramodal  Competition
(Ratings are H=High,  M=Medium,  or L=Low.)
Option  Rating  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status  quo)  L  Inherent  in monolithic  railway in most countries.
(2)  Lines-of-business  organization  L  All the lines of business  are facets  of a single company  and
would  be intended  better to position  the railway in relation
to other modes.
(3)  Competitive  access  H  By  definition,  this  option  is  intended  to  introduce
intramodal  competition  in specified  markets.
(4)  "Wholesaler"  H  The existence of the railway "wholesaler" implies more
than one "retailer"in a given market.
(5)  "Toil rail" enterprise  M  Unless the toil rail is specifically  open to more than one
operator  per market, there is no guarantee that intramodal
competition  will increase  by means of this option.
Table 3.5
Characterization  of Generic Options Based on Appropriateness of Maintenance Levels
(Ratings  are H=Hligh, M=Medium,  or L=Low.)
Option  Rating  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status  quo)  M  See conflicting  tendencies  described in text.
(2)  Lines-of-buiness organization  M  Depends on depth of lines-of-business  organization, and its
relationship  with the facility  maintenance  department.
(3)  Competitive  access  M  Can involve monolithic  railways with conflicting  tendencies
(see text).
(4)  "Wholesaler"  M+  Presumably  governed  by  detailed  agreements between
wholesaler  and retailers.
(5)  "Toll rail" enterprise  ?*  Whetier appropriate  maintenance  levels are likely in a "toil
rail" option  will depend  on the way in which tolls are set and
the specific functional  responsibilities  of the operating and
facility entities.
* Depends  on pricing- 43 -
Private Sector Development
85.  Among other objectives, a government  may  reshape its railway so as to enhance  the role
of the private sector. Few of the Bank's borrowers will wish to divest the railway in its entirety
to private ownership; many would, however, consider allowing multiple institutions, private
and/or public, to provide services over a publicly owned infrastructure with prospects for an
expanding role over time.  Table 3.6 rates each generic option on its ability to foster private
involvement.
Start-up/Transaction  Costs
86.  Reshaping the railway implies both a  startup investment and changes in  continuing
transaction  expenses. In some  cases, particularly  those  involving  the creation  of multiple  entities
in place of the monolithic  railway, both the initial and subsequent  administrative  cost burdens
will be relatively  high and must be weighed  against  other factors  (e.g., changes  in transportation
revenues and expenses; likely gains on sales of property; service benefits and public policy
considerations).  However attractive the long-term outlook may be for a given scenario, its
startup costs must obviously be affordable.  As a result, this issue will enter into railway
planning  at its earliest stages.  Table 3.7 characterizes  the initial and continuing  administrative
cost burden of the various options.
Summary  Discussion of Issues.
87.  Table 3.8 describes the generic options in terms of their responsiveness  to each of the
issues.  As might be expected, the monolithic railway rates high on technical  efficiency (since
conflicts are  decided by  executive fiat and  transaction costs are  minimized), but  low on
marketing effectiveness considerations.  The  lines-of-business  option  offers  improved
responsiveness to markets and accountability, but reflects increased operating conflicts and
transaction costs as the monolith  begins to crumble.  The competitive access option introduces
intramodal  competition  in selected markets,  while maintaining  unitary control over most railway
operations. Unless the distribution  of "franchises" is self-balancing,  providing clear benefits to
aU participants, the owning railways are unlikely to permit a serious level of competition in
markets which they have traditionally  controlled. Thus, competitive  access is an evolutionary
approach. The 'wholesaler" option should  accomplish  an excellent  marketing  job, but the actual
operation would remain in monolithic hands.  Finally, the  "tol rail" enterprise might come
closest to  reflecting a  theoretical model of marketing effectiveness; yet it  would generate
potential operating conflicts and higher transaction costs. This option would also caU for the
highest degree of administrative  capability in the owning government.
88.  Underlying  aU these issues and options is the basic tradeoff between  efficiency  of
production  and effectiveness  in meeting  market needs.  The traditional  monolithic  railway,
organized in  a strictly hierarchical pattern along departmental lines, is geared to producing
maximal  amounts of relatively undifferentiated  output with minimal  inputs.  However, what the
customer wants and what the competition  will provide does not necessarily mesh fully with the- 44 -
Table 3.6
Characterization  of Generic  Options  Based on Private Sector Development
(Ratings are H=High,  M=Medium,  or L=Low.)
Option  Raing  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status quo)  L  The monolithic  railway,  by definition,  is not to be sold off
piecemeal,  although  some contracting  is possible.
(2)  Lines-of-business  organization  M  Although still subsidiary to  the monolith, the  lines of
business may lend themselves  at least to joint-venture  or
other creative  arrangements  with the private sector.
(3)  Competitive  access  M  This  option is  still conducted by  monolithic carriers,
although some private involvement in  the reshaping is
possible.
(4)  "Wholesaler"  H  Presumably  the "retailers" would come from the private
sector.
(5)  "Toll rail" enterprise  H  The splitting  of functions  could easily lend itself to private
sector participation.
Table 3.7
Characterization  of Generic  Options  Based on Startup/Transaction  Costs
(tatings  are H=High,  M=Mediun,  or L=Low.)
Option  Rating  Discussion
(1)  Monolithic  railway (status  quo)  L  By definition, a single entity in a status quo situation must
have zero "startup" costs and low transaction  costs.
(2)  Lines-of-business  organization  M  Startup  costs  would  vary with the scope  of the changes made;
transaction costs would have to  increase as more precise
accounting  is introduced  for internal transactions.
(3)  Competitive  access  M  WiU  vary with the precise nature  of the operation. Trackage
rights  operations will,  at  the  very  least,  lead  to  new
transactions  among the competitors.
(4)  "Wholesaler"  M  Although  the nature of the tansactions wil be more complex
than under the status quo, the number  of transactions  should
decrease because of the relatively  small number of "retail"
customers  of the railway "wholesaler".
(5)  "Toll rail" enterprise  H  The complete  separation  of functions  envisioned  in this option
should lead to the highest startup and transaction  costs.-45  -
Table 3.8
Summary Characterization  of Generic Reshaping Options
(Options are rated High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L)  according to their responsiveness to each issue.
The characteriations  are for generic options and would nawally  vary with the particular  of specific
options scrutinized.)
______._____  ,___  Options  and Characterizations
(1)  (2)  (S)
Monolkhic  Lines-of-  (3)  "Toll
Railway  Business  Competive  (4)  Rail"
Issues  (status  quo)  Organization  Access  "Wholesaler"  Enterprise
MarketDefinition  L  H  M  H  M
Financial  Accountability  L  M or L  M or L  M  H
Ease  of Operadons
Coordination  H  M  M  M  L
Intamodal  Compeution  L  L  H  H  M
Appropriate  Maintenance  ?
Levels  M  M  M  M+  (Depends  on
. pricing)
Track  Maintenance  Coordi-  H  M  M  M  L
nation with Operations  l
Private  Sector  Development  L  M  M  H  H
Start-up  Problems  and
Transaction  Cost  Burdens  L  M  M  M  H
railway's production efficiency. Thus, by contrast, the reshaped railway - whatever the depth
of the attempted restructuring  - seeks to serve each market in a manner that maximizes either
profits or other benefits dictated by its agreement with the State. 43'  Regardless of the precise
objective, a market-sensitive  railway may be less "efficient" than a well-managed  monolithic
entity in terms of production,  and yet be much more effective in fulfilling  its goals of improved
service quality and commercial  performance.
89.  For example, a restructured railway will typically  establish separate "commercial" and
"noncommercial"  lines of business. The former would be operated on a commercial, for-profit
basis and would be self-supporting  and generally  unregulated;  the latter would  be operated  under
contract with government  at some level(s), and would receive operating subventions  under the
"public service obligation (PSO)" rubric.  This dichotomy  would free the railway to operate as
43/ For a detailed  discussion  of contracts  between  the State  and  the railway  (among  other  steps  in a
methodical  restructuring  approach),  see Huff  and  Thompson,  op. cit.- 46 -
a  commercial enterprise by  reducing the  government's span of  control to  separable PSO
functions  only, and would encourage  both railway and government  to view PSO functions  as a
business relationship between customer and contract supplier.  By the railway's traditional
measures  of technical operating efficiency  (e.g., coach-kilometers  per locomotive-kilometer),
the restructured services, taken together, may appear to fall below historical levels.  This
decrease, however, may mask a host of steps taken by the respective lines of business to boost
the responsiveness  of each service to customers' needs and willingness  to pay.  The result should
be a more profitable railway in the case of commercial  services, and noncommercial  services
that better fulfill their public policy motivations.
TEcENcAL CONSIDERATIONS
90.  The following topics, while highly technical  in nature, require careful consideration  in
the planning and implementation  phases of railway restructuring.
Cost Assigment  Techniques
91.  Cost assignment 44' under some of the options undergoes the test of inter-entity nego-
tiations. In such negotiations,  each entity looks out for itself first. To assure long-term  viability
of the entire structure, nevertheless, the cost assignment  scheme should pass additional tests:
measurement  of the comprehensive  cost effects on all entities, and assessing the relationship  of
costs to benefits.
92.  Comprehensive Cost Effects on all Entities.  Cost assignment techniques, however
equitable and plausible on the surface, influence  operating decisions by railway entities.  The
general rule is that, whatever cost factor is used, the paying railway will seek to minimize it
over the long term.  Through minimization  of that cost factor, additional long-term costs may
unwittingly accrue to all entities involved.
93.  Assume, for example, a "toll rail" option involving  a facility  entity and several operators.
If  the facility entity charges other users by  the wagon-kilometers  they generate, then the
operators will have an added incentive to reduce the number of wagons operated.  In freight
service, for example, this additional impetus can accelerate the trend toward larger wagons,
heavier axle loadings, and potentially  increased long-term degradation  of the track structure.
Each year, the operator saves, while the extent and cause of the incremental  damage may pass
44/ In this  paper, the term "cost  allocation"  denotes  a division  of common  costs  among  elements  of
a single  organization  by management  fiat, and connotes  a mostly  theoretical  (paper)  exercise.
"Cost assignment,"  on the other  hand,  implies  any means  of ascertaining  cost responsibilities,
fixing  the  operating  parameters  (cost  factors)  on which  charges  are  based,  establishing  unit  rates,
and passing  the costs  through  to the responsible  organizations. "Cost assignment"  therefore
subsumes,  in addition  to "allocation,"  negotiations  and agreements  among  different  entities  or
among  clearly  delineated  business  units of a single  entity.- 47 -
undetected and uncharged for. In the end, someone  must pay for heavier maintenance  or even
for an "upgrading" project; or the operating  capabilities  and profitability  potential  of the railway
deteriorate.
94.  By the same token, if the facility entity charges by the train-kilometer,  then the operator
will have an incentive to run fewer, but longer, trains.  This step  degrades service frequency
and may adversely affect market share and long-term revenues in both freight and passenger
service.
95.  Thus, the total costs and business  implications  of a particular cost assignment  policy over
the long term may be very different than the initial prospect to both the facility and operating
entity, or to the responsible ministry. Indeed, a separation  of functions  implies a fragmentation
of civil, mechanical, movement, and marketing  decisions among separate entities. Monolithic
railways have  often failed  to synthesize  engineering,  operating,  and economic  decisions,  but have
at least had the opportunity  to do so; reshaped railways, on the other hand, must often overcome
deliberately  created institutional  barriers in making long-term decisions  that are optimal for all
entities and concerned  polities taken together.
96.  Cost assignment-driven  trends such as  this would not operate immediately or  with
scientific precision, and would not necessarily overwhelm all other management  decisions.
Hidden costs  may arise  even without such scenarios as  those described above.  Yet  an
unconsidered choice of cost assignment  parameters can influence engineering and operating
decisions  over the long term.  These  influences  may  manifest  themselves  in almost  imperceptible
distortions in trajectory rather than overt changes in direction.
97.  Relationship of Costs to Benefits.  Typically, a large-scale  railway restructuring aims
at affording  maximal  flexibility to the successor  operating  companies  to act as businesses. The
chosen cost assignment scheme can affect this flexibility by  encouraging or  discouraging
innovation and  expansions into new and  potentially profitable lines of  business.  As an
elementary  example, again based on the "toll rail" option, the fixed facility entity may charge
a standard per-unit rate for track maintenance  (or some other function).  The operating entity
may be considering  the addition  of a new dedicated  train to serve a completely  new market with
no adverse effect on existing revenue sources.  Depending on how the rate was originally
calculated, the incremental  track maintenance  imposed  by the new service could be far less than
the charges it will have to bear at the standard rate.  If the cost assignment  scheme makes no
allowance for opportunities such as  this, including (of course) a mechanism for long-term
alterations to fit changing circumstances  and to avoid shortfalls  in meeting total costs, then the
transportation  economics  of both entities may suffer.  This situation  points to a potential  pitfall
in  some reshaping options:  cost assignments may become ossified, necessitating formal
negotiations  to develop quick responses  to marketing  opportunities. A monolithic  entity, on the
other hand, if creatively managed, may be able to respond to situations  like the example above
much more quickly.- 48 -
98.  Moreover, depending  on the mechanism  yielding the costing formulas, special interests
may be able to influence  the assignments  so as to convert them into cross-subsidies. Likewise,
assignment  schemes  may  become  rigid over time, thus incrementally  creating  cross-subsidies  and
beneficiary  groups as underlying conditions  change while the formulas remain fixed.
99.  Creative Approaches to Cost Assignment. While cost assignment  schemes based on
traditional units of measurement  (train-km, wagon-km, gross ton-km) may appeal in that they
intuitively relate to the consumption  of the track structure, they can have negative long-term
impacts  through  the subtle  distortions  they may induce  in marketing,  movement,  and mechanical
policies. Therefore, developers  of the cost assignment  scheme for a given reshaping  application
might consider introduction of cost factors related to revenue generation (revenue ton-km,
revenue passenger-kIn,  percentage  of revenues)  where they  can serve as rough surrogates  for use
of the property and where they will give operating management  the "right" incentives. Sliding
scales based on levels of service (i.e., different rates for different traffic densities), compound
calculations (use of more than one cost factor:  e.g.,  X per wagon-km plus Y per revenue
ton-kie 45 ), or some combination  of all these approaches  might produce a more supple costing
technique that avoids long-term distortions and encourages the entrepreneurial spirit in  the
operator(s).
100.  Cost assignment techniques clearly have implications far beyond the transportation
economics of the railway entities. Public policy may dictate certain objectives in  terms of
quantities  of rail transportation  produced, in order to meet energy consumption,  environmental,
development,  or other social goals.  If the cost assignment  techniques  ignore these implications,
then the underlying purpose of the entire reorganization  scheme may be subverted.
Techniques  for Developing  Appropriate  Fixed Facility  Maintenance  and Investment  Levels
101.  In any reshaping  option, the proper matching  of maintenance  to needs would  benefit from
three techniques: (1) institutionalizing  the process for establishing  maintenance  standards for
each facility; (2) designating  an appropriate maintaining  entity; and (3) providing  arrangements
to insure future equilibrium  in the facility maintenance  function.  The balance of this chapter
treats these techniques  in turn and concludes with a related topic:  planning  for investments  in
the fixed plant.
102.  Maintenance Standards.  An appropriate  protocol  for developing  maintenance  standards
in  an option involving more than one entity might include the following.  (The suggested
procedures assume, for simplicity, that the facility condition  on the effective  date of the option
requires no immediate  capital investment.)
45/ See,  for example,  the suggested  cost  assignment  regime  under  the competitive  cost  accesa  option
in Chapter  2.- 49 -
(a)  Identify Required Line Capabilities.  Wherever  a  reshaping  occurs, the
successor  companies  need  to establish  what  services  will  operate  over  each  facility
and what will be the performance  characteristics  for each service over that
facility.
(b)  Match Maintenance  Standards to Required  Capabilities. For each  facility,  the
parties  need  to agree  on the standard  to which  it will  be maintained  to fulfill  the
highest  requirements  placed  upon  it while  meeting  the needs  of all services. For
track,  appropriate  performance  and  design standards for  geometrics  and
components  would  solidify  at this  point.  In such  negotiations,  the intended  service
levels  for some  operators  may have  to give way  in the face  of likely  cost  levels.
(c)  Develop  a Maintenance  Plan.  Based  on the intended  uses of, and agreed  upon
standards  for, the properties,  the parties  will need  to develop  a maintenance  plan
showing  the procedures  that will constitute  "normalized"  maintenance  into the
future.  Because actual experience  may vary widely from the pro-forma
definition,  periodic  review  of track  conditions  and adjustments  in the maintenance
plan will be necessary  in accordance  with  an agreed  procedure.
(d)  Develop  Data Underlying  Cost  Assignment.  If more  than  one  operator  uses  the
facility,  three  basic issues  inhere  in maintenance  cost allocation:
*  The levels  of service,  hence  plant,  required  by each  operator. (All  other
things  being  equal,  the operator  who imposes  the highest  standards  would
pay the highest  unit cost.)
3  The  unit  degradation  imposed  on the  plant  by each  operator. (An  operator
may cause  disproportionate  maintenance  expense  even  if the standards  it
requires,  and the volumes  of traffic  it carries  over the line, are relatively
low.)
*  The volumes  envisioned  by each  operator. (Low  volumes  may, in some
cases,  reduce  the operator's  fair share  of some  fixed  costs.)
Documentation  supporting  the above issues would be assembled  during the
planning  process to form a basis for cost assignment  decisions.  In reality,
however,  these  issues  often  defy quantification  (or the expense  of quantification
exceeds  the benefits  in terms of accuracy)  and the "truth" emerges through
negotiation  rather than through  science.
103.  Selection  of Maintaining  Entity. Since  maintenance  standards  and cost  allocations  raise
so  many  tricky  issues  in a reshaping  option,  the  choice  of maintenance  entity  plays  a critical  role
in assuring  a constant  and  appropriate  level  of physical  capability.  The organization  performing
the maintenance  will  either  be the  primary  operator,  the  facility  entity,  or a monolithic  entity  that- 50  -
controls  both facilities  and operations. The institutional  framework for the maintenance  function
will depend on  whether single or  multiple operators use  the  facility.  Conceivably, the
maintenance  function could devolve to more than one entity based on geographical  or detailed
functional  breakdowns. (It is hard to see, however, a case in which more than one entity could
perform maintenance  of a single subsystem,  for example track, in a single location.)  If two
operators over a given facility have equal primacy, the selection of a maintaining  entity would
be made by negotiation.  Finally, in unusual circumstances, the least important of multiple
operators  could indeed have maintenance  responsibility;  a short line owner/operator  could, for
example, do the maintenance  even though the bulk of the tonnage results from trackage rights.
Such a case actually exists in the Midwestern  United States.
104.  As with all decisions in a reshaping scenario, the choice of maintaining entity should
consider the natural tendencies  of the parties involved. The following  discussion focuses, first,
on the two principal parties in a "toll-road" option (the facility  entity and the operator), and then
covers the monolithic  railway.
(a)  Tendencies of the Facility Entity.  The facility entity has a long-term goal of
protecting  the utility, productivity,  and value of its property. Nevertheless,  in the
short term, its high fixed costs (interest  on debt, and potentially  taxes) may give
it an incentive  to charge maximal  fixed and variable fees to users while skimping
on variable maintenance  expense.  This tendency may arise at the outset of the
restructuring  if the facility  entity receives  the plant in outstanding  condition,  since
degradation  may occur very slowly. Such a tendency  will gain momentum  if the
financial  arrangements  with the govemment  allow the facility entity to look with
confidence to  the  future funding of  an  "upgrading" project to  restore any
maintenance  deferrals.
Countermeasures  do exist to such a predilection  to deferral.  First, if the facility
entity has modest operating and financial goals and a  well-assured revenue
stream, then its short-term  tendency to skimp on maintenance  will wane.  Also,
if the facility entity's management  perceives a clear financial link between the
quantity and quality of maintenance  performed, and the fees paid by users, then
such  management will  have  greater  incentive  to  perform  the  required
maintenance,  especially  if the verification  methods  and penalties discussed  below
are effected.  Finally, if nothing  else, liability  considerations  should motivate  the
fixed facility entity to fulfill its obligations. Indeed, the examples  in Chapter 2
show how large liability concerns loom even in a small-scale  separation.
(b)  Tendencies of the Operating Entity.  An operating entity would likewise have
a long-term goal of protecting  its operating capabilities,  both to enhance service
marketability and to reduce movement  costs.  Nevertheless, an operating entity
maintaining  the track could also have short term profitability  incentives  to skimp
on  maintenance if  the  facility  starts  out  in  relatively  good  condition, if
degradation  is gradual, if the facility entity neglects to observe the condition of- 51  -
its property, and if there are no secondary  operators to notice the cutbacks. Such
shortsighted  tendencies  would  weaken  if the operator begins its corporate life with
an ample positive cash flow, and if it perceives direct and immediate benefits
from adhering  to the maintenance  plan. Since the facility  entity will benefit from
the preservation of the property, and since certain types of deterioration result
from the passage  of time rather than trains, discreetly  couched incentive  payments
from the facility to  the operating entity may prove appropriate.  Verifying
performance or neglect, an independent  inspection program would serve as a
powerful negative motivation  for the operator to adhere to the maintenance  plan.
(c)  Tendencies  of  a  Monolithic  Entity.  A  facility  entity/primary operator
(monolithic  entity) would  have short- and long-term tendencies  somewhat  similar
to  those of  completely separated entities.  In  fact,  a  unitary entity might
deliberately  embark on a program of maintenance  deferrals  more easily, and with
less commotion and adverse publicity, than a pure facility or operating entity:
the decision to defer could be made at the top, subordinates  would simply carry
it  out  quietly,  and  outside  authorities  (for  example,  government  safety
inspectorates) might discover it only after the fact.  With separate owning and
operating  entities,  deferral  decisions would  come  to  light  with  a  speed
proportionate  to the vigilance  of the non-maintaining  entity. If strong  enough  and
operating at enough volume, the secondary operator(s) might insist on higher
maintenance  levels, but these might only be reflected in higher trackage rights
fees in the next year.  Indeed, the sample  trackage rights agreement (in Chapter
2)  explicitly provides  that  the  secondary operator  may  request  as  much
maintenance  as it wants -- if it is willing to pay.
105.  Although aU entities could share long-term tendencies to  maintain, and  short-term
inclinations  to neglect, the property, the operator may perform the maintenance  function more
assiduously than the  facility entity (if different). The operator would feel the  effects of
deterioration relatively quickly, both through declines in  service and revenues, and through
increases in movement  expenses.  On the other hand, the facility entity would at first perceive
shortfalls on the revenue side only.  As the presumed dispatcher, the operator would also
coordinate the interaction of maintenance  and train movements more readily than the facility
entity.
106.  Continuing Arrangements.  Owing to the complexities  of facility maintenance  issues,
a strategic plan for a reshaping option should  propose a continuing  institutional  arrangement to
deal with all these concerns.  Verification  and inspection of facility maintenance  on a periodic
basis by an impartial party, coupled with appropriate and automatic monetary incentives and
disincentives,  would help to assure adherence  to the planned standards. Such inspections  would
also confirm whether the pro-forma maintenance  plan matches  actual needs, and would  pinpoint
recommended changes.  Evolving marketing approaches, hence service requirements, of the
operators would also motivate  maintenance  plan changes, which should  take place in a collegial
and technical forum.- 52  -
107.  Investment Decisions.  LUke  maintenance  planning, investment  and disinvestment
decisions  require  close  coordination  between  all entities  involved  in railway  restructuring.  Such
decisions  also entail early participation  by the financing  authorities,  both governmental  and
private.  Thus, the evaluator  of a  reshaping  scheme should ask:  during and after the
restructuring,  who will  be choosing  to upgrade  or downgrade  facilities,  how  will the choices  be
made,  and who will have  responsibility  for implementation?  Will the established  process  lead
to comprehensive,  businesslike  decisions that encompass  future marketing  considerations,
revenue  streams,  expenses,  and the initial  investment  to be made? Under  proper  management,
a  monolithic  railway would at least have the potential to  set its  investment  priorities
systematically  and comprehensively.  In some  reshaping  options,  by contrast,  the evaluation  of
a project  may  be so fragmented  among  entities  as to permit  only  analysis  of its elements  rather
than synthesis  of its overall  costs  and benefits.
108.  Clearly,  a reshaping  scheme  would  call for an especially  methodical  program  for making
investment/disinvestment  decisions. Unless  such  a mechanism  is in place, the self-interest  of
the  parties  involved  may  distort  the  decision-making  process  and result  either  in a 'bad" decision
(as measured  against  the goals of the restructuring)  or no decision  at all, which could also
impede  the achievement  of the goals. However,  a methodical,  consultative  approach  to such
decisions would -- at best -- make spontaneous  responses to fleeting opportunities  difficult to
obtain.- 53  -
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
This acronym...  ...refers to
AAR  Association  of American Railroads
APL  American President  Lines
BR  State railway of the United Kingdom (British  Rail)
BU  "Business  unit" as referred to in the Spanish restructuring
CER  Community  of European  Railways
CN  Canadian  National Railways
CP  Canadian  Pacific Railway
DB  State railway of the former German Federal Republic (Deutsche
Bundesbahn)
DEAG  Deutsche  Eisenbahn AG (proposed successor to state railways of
Germany)
DR  State railway of the former German Democratic Republic (Deutsche
Reichsbahn)
EC  European Community
JNR  Former State railway of Japan (Japanese  National Railways)  (now
restructured into smaller companies, see text)
PSO  Public service obligation: the British term for explicit government
subventions  to preserve rail services of no redeeming  commercial
value, but of perceived social value.  This term is used in that
sense throughout the report.
RENFE  State railway of Spain
Si  State railway of Sweden
SNCF  State railway of France (Societe  nationale  des chemins  defer
firanfais)
UIC  International  Union of Railways (Union  internationale  des chemins
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